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ABSTRACT
This study addresses the resource management problem in a large scale networked system
with high flexibility. We consider the supply and demand management problem specifically in the
context of the future Smart Grid. On the supply side, we design a secondary market to provide
stochastic energy service via distributed renewable energy resources. The performance of the
proposed market is evaluated in two circumstances, i.e. whether or not the extra energy penetration
caused by the market changes the operation point of the power grid. On the demand side, we would
like to take the advantages of the residential demand flexibility to relieve consumption peaks and
stabilize the system. We conduct certain demand response in a market approach and further build
a real experiment system to analyze the performance of such regime.
The study of supply side market is referred to the subheading: Small-Scale Markets for a
Bilateral Energy Sharing Economy followed by an extension of the corresponding market which
brings in the concern that the increased energy penetration may change the operation point of
the grid. As for the demand side study, design and analysis of such demand response market
is under the subheading: Mean Field Games in Nudge Systems for Societal Networks and the real
experiment built-up is presented in Incentive-Based Demand Response: Empirical Assessment and
Critical Appraisal. We model the agent behaviour in both markets via game theoretic approach
and analyze the equilibrium performance. We show that a Mean Field Game regime can be applied
to accurately approximate these repeated game frameworks and socially desirable equilibria that
benefit both system operator and agents exist.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Resource management problem in large scale system such as communication network, trans-
portation system and power grid becomes more complex when the uncertainty of the resource is
high. In power grid, the resource should be allocated economically so that supply and demand are
balanced at any time. With increasing renewable energy penetration, it is more and more difficult
for the system operator to fully utilize such time effective resources. Whereas the flexibility of
demand could help to handle the uncertainty of supply through intelligent management. Markets
facilitate trades taking advantages of such flexibility and potentially allocate resource efficiently.
People have proposed many market mediated sharing systems in the forms ranging from bartering
to bargaining. Such systems often involve large number of users with infrequent interactions in
any random subset of the total population. The users usually make decisions on the time and quan-
tity of possessing the corresponding resource repeatedly. Given these attributes, mean field game
framework is a promising approach towards studying such systems.
In Chapter 2, motivated by the ever-increasing installation of photovoltaics in homes and small
businesses, we consider a general small-scale market for agent-to-agent (energy) resource sharing,
in which each agent could either be a seller (server) or a buyer (client) in each time period. In every
time period of the market, a server has a certain amount of resources (e.g., units of energy) that
any client could consume, and randomly gets matched with a client. Our target is to maximize the
resource utilization in such an agent-to-agent market, where the agents are strategic. During each
successful transaction, the server gets money and the client gets resources. Hence, trade ratio max-
imization implies efficiency maximization in our system. We model the proposed market system
through a Mean Field Game approach and prove the existence of Mean Field Equilibria in general,
and also ones that can achieve an almost 100% trade ratio. Finally, we carry out a simulation study
on a generic problem instance and a case-study of a proposed photovoltaic market, and show the
designed market benefits both individuals and the system as a whole. A reasonable extension of
the proposed energy sharing market to a larger scale system so that different trade ratios between
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different locations induce different operating points of the power grid, i.e. different Locational
Marginal Prices (LMP), is discussed at the end of this chapter. This extension essentially dives
into the question what if the agents in such market is price anticipating instead of price taking.
In Chapter 3, we consider the general problem of resource sharing in societal networks, con-
sisting of interconnected communication, transportation, energy and other networks important to
the functioning of society. Participants in such network need to take decisions daily, both on the
quantity of resources to use as well as the periods of usage. With this in mind, we discuss the
problem of incentivizing users to behave in such a way that society as a whole benefits. In order to
perceive societal level impact, such incentives may take the form of rewarding users with lottery
tickets based on good behavior, and periodically conducting a lottery to translate these tickets into
real rewards. We will pose the user decision problem as a mean field game (MFG), and the incen-
tives question as one of trying to select a good mean field equilibrium (MFE). In such a framework,
each agent (a participant in the societal network) takes a decision based on an assumed distribution
of actions of his/her competitors, and the incentives provided by the social planner. The system is
said to be at MFE if the agent’s action is a sample drawn from the assumed distribution. We will
show the existence of such an MFE under general settings, and also illustrate how to choose an
attractive equilibrium using as an example demand-response in the (smart) electricity network.
In Chapter 4, we present the system design and results of a real user demand-response exper-
iment in the Smart Grid based on the analytical results discussed in Chapter 3. Demand response
(DR) provides both operational and financial benefits to a variety of stakeholders in the power sys-
tem. As an example, in the deregulated market such as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT), load serving entities (LSEs) usually purchase electricity from the wholesale market
and sign fixed retail price contracts with their end-consumers. Therefore, end-consumers’ load
shift from peak to off-peak hours could benefit the LSE in terms of largely reducing its electricity
purchase with extremely high price from the real-time market. As a first-of-its-kind implemen-
tation of coupon incentive-based demand response (CIDR), the EnergyCoupon project provides
end-consumers with dynamic time-of-the-day DR event announcements, individualized coupon
2
targets, as well as periodic lottery experiments. This chapter summarizes the design methodology,
the critical findings, and potential generalization of such experiment based on the activities in the
summer of 2017. Comparison with the conventional time-of-the-day price-based DR program is
conducted. It is shown that by combining dynamic coupon with lotteries, the effective cost for
demand response providers can be reduced substantially while achieving the same level of demand
reduction.
In Chapter 5, we conclude with a summary of the main results of this dissertation.
3
2. SMALL-SCALE MARKETS FOR A BILATERAL ENERGY SHARING ECONOMY ∗
2.1 Introduction
The sharing economy is a paradigm shift in the working of the twenty-first century market-
place. Supported by the ease of communication and availability of information provided by the
Internet, this marketplace innovation has blurred the line between producers and consumers, turn-
ing participants into prosumers who can both provide and utilize resources and services. Successful
platforms here enable access to resources that are commonplace, but are needed at the right place
and at the right time. Typically, these resources are such that “unused value is wasted value,” in that
idle time cannot be utilized later on. Examples include peer-to-peer (P2P) networks such as Bit-
Torrent (bartering of bandwidth), Fon (token-based WiFi sharing), Uber/Lyft (typically, fixed-price
car sharing), and Airbnb (marketplace-mediated home sharing).
Prosumers typically provide or consume small amounts of resources, which means that bilateral
trade (one-to-one) is the norm. Thus, the sharing platform enables bilateral trading, with options
ranging from barter to bargaining with monetary instruments. Prosumers are ephemeral in that
they might participate for some duration of time, and then switch to some other platform or stop
altogether. The number of participants at any time is large, which is how sharing systems manage
to match demand and supply. Also, in most existing sharing systems, prosumers act largely as
consumers or producers, but rarely switch roles.
A novel set of applications are now emerging in which prosumers switch roles from being
producers to consumers frequently. Here, agents have either demand or resources that are bursty,
which results in recurring role changes. Like P2P networks used for content sharing, these applica-
tions are associated with easily sharable resources, and provide services that are indistinguishable
from traditional sources. In this chapter, we consider agent-to-agent (A2A) market design in the
context of distributed electricity generation and consumption. We focus on rooftop-photovoltaics
∗This chapter has been submitted to IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems and is under review. An
alternative version is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.04427
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(PV) based electricity generation at the level of homes and small businesses, where generation de-
pends on the intensity of sunshine. Here, geographic vagaries mean that one can shift from being
a producer to consumer often, and the existing grid can allow incorporation of these resources. A
traditional alternative exists here in the form of electricity purchase from a utility provider.
While there are existing platforms using a two-sided market approach for some applications,
approaches that focus on prosumers that frequently change roles from provider to consumer are
few. Consider a bilateral market in which currency is used as the instrument of trading. A simple
mechanism is one in which a consumer (that we term as a client) is matched to a random producer
(that we term as a server), each places a bid, and a trade happens if the client bids higher than the
server’s demand. The server then receives the currency equal to her bid, and must incur a cost of
providing service. Thus, an agent in a client role pays the agent in a server role to obtain resources.
Likewise, the agent that is currently a server can use these currency units to obtain resources when
it in turn becomes a client. Also, each time an agent in a client role obtains resources, it generates
surplus, measured in currency units. This corresponds, for example, to the productivity gains due to
obtaining electricity. If the client does not succeed in obtaining service under the sharing economy,
it faces a cost, which can be thought of as the negative feeling of having to search for an alternative
source or to experience delays. Would such a market be sustainable, i.e., would there be enough
resource trades generating currency (surplus) such that available resource utilization is high?
In this chapter, we develop a game theoretic framework to model and analyze A2A markets for
electric energy under the mechanism described above. The choice of mechanism often depends
on the timescale of resource usage, with simple solutions such as bartering being effective at short
timescales, and more complex ones like bargaining at long timescales. The timescale of hours for
energy sharing suggests that a low complexity solution is desirable, and the value of our proposed
solution will be apparent in later sections. In the context of our application, random matching
of agents is viable since integration of renewable energy into the electricity grid is already well
established in the US (eg. using net-metering in which customers can sell back excess renewable
energy generated [4]). The net effect is to simply inject power into the bus to which the producer
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is connected, while the consumer draws energy from the grid at the bus to which it is connected.
Hence, the electrons produced by the producer are not directly transferred to the consumer, and
only monies are transferred between consumer and producer.
Our market model consists of random matching between a large number of ephemeral agents
that might leave at any time. We assume that a departing agent is replaced with a new agent,
keeping the total number of agents fixed. The state of any agent is the amount of currency that it
possesses at that time. A client can be constrained to place a bid only if it has sufficient currency
to do so. It is clear that such a budget constraint might restrict entering agents from obtaining
resources, and result in low trade volume. Indeed, some P2P networks such as BitTorrent build
in a measure of altruism to reduce friction in the system. In this chapter, we consider models in
which the client may obtain a loan in order to pay for service. The client must pay back the loan
with interest after the trade using the currency (surplus) generated by receiving resources and any
budget money in its coffers. We consider two loan options, namely, (i) the client can obtain the
loan from an outside lending agency – a bank-loan, or (ii) from the server itself – a peer-loan.
The peer-loan model is the most general in that an infinite interest rate will ensure a hard budget
constraint, while the bank-loan model is a special case under which the client pays interest, but the
server sees a zero interest rate as the interest is transferred out of the system.
2.1.1 Mean Field Games
We investigate the existence of an equilibrium using the framework of Mean Field Games
(MFG) [5]. Here, each agent assumes that the matched agent would play an action drawn indepen-
dently from a fixed distribution over its bid space. The agent then chooses an action that is a best
response against actions drawn in this manner. The system is said to be at Mean Field Equilibri-
um (MFE) if this best response action is itself a sample drawn from the assumed bid distribution.
This framework considerably reduces computational overhead, and can easily be shown to be an
accurate approximation in range of applications [2, 6–8] including our context, when the number
of agents is large enough.
The MFG framework offers a relatively simple way of modeling and analyzing large-scale
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games when each subset of agents interacts infrequently. In the context of the sharing economy,
a particular producer and consumer would rarely be matched together multiple times in their life-
times, since the number of participants is large and participant lifetime is limited. This implies that
little utility is lost due to minimal history retention, and the action choice becomes less complex.
The main related papers in the MFG setting are [6, 7]. In [6], a sytem for auctioning adver-
tisements on a webpage is considered. Here agents are advertisers that bid for these spots, and
the main result shows how convergence to the MFE takes place while learning about the value of
winning a slot on the webpage. The model is extended in [7] to include hard budget constraints
in the sense that agents may only bid an amount less than their existing budget. The budget it-
self is updated according to an independent arrival process, and the result is a characterization of
the reduced bid that would be made in this case. Neither of these considers matching markets of
producers and consumers that are interchangeable.
2.1.2 Other Related Work
There has recently been much work in the context of the sharing economy, but little in the way
of understanding systems in which agents change their roles often. Most work that deals with this
problem considers the special case of data/spectrum sharing in wireless networks. For instance, [9]
study pricing models for a system like Fon in which WiFi is shared. In the same manner, [10, 11]
study spectrum sharing and mobile data offload in which peers can use each other’s resources in the
setting of a small number of agents. They consider mechanisms across a small number of agents
such as contracts and double auctions. However, they do not consider repeated play with learning
of behaviors.
In the context of sharing electricity storage resources, [12] considers a model of charging when
prices are low and sharing when prices are high. However, storage is currently very expensive and
its penetration is still low as compared to PV installations, particularly in Texas which is the setting
of our case study. Hence, we do not assume any storage, and usage by a consumer can only happen
with successful trade.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work that considers mechanism design for bi-
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lateral (A2A) repeated games with role switching agents between producer (server) and consumer
(client) in the mean-field setting. Our initial analysis on this problem [1] only considers the spe-
cial case of the bank-loan model. Furthermore, it only presents an overview of results and no
proofs are included. The current work generalizes the results to the peer-loan model that subsumes
hard budget constraints, bank-loan, as well as peer-loan and also emphasizes the methodological
contribution by presenting the important proofs.
2.1.3 Main Results
We present a characterization of the mean-field equilibrium bid distribution for the general case
of the peer-loan model, and show the existence of a mean-field equilibrium with all the important
proofs. We show that there exists a set of equilibria that are simple, and characterized by the server
setting a fixed price k, while the client chooses whether or not to bid k based on her budget and
estimate of future value. In particular, the client decision turns out to be a set of divisions of the
budget into intervals, with k being optimal in some and 0 being optimal in others. In all cases, if
the budget is sufficiently large, the client always bids k, while if it is sufficiently small, it always
bids 0.
The stable bid k is not unique, and a set of such bids exist (with the minimum being lower
bounded by server cost, and the maximum being upper bounded by the client surplus plus cost of
not obtaining service), each one of which is an MFE. However, the fraction of time that a trade
happens (i.e, the client actually bids k) is not the same for all systems and all values of k. In
particular, the bank-loan and peer-loan models both attain higher trade ratios than the hard budget
constrained system, particularly in the case when the initial budget of an agent is low. Essentially,
a small boost in the form of a loan (which is retuned immediately with interest via the surplus
generated by the trade) is successful in reducing friction in the market allowing it to attain high
efficiency.
The trade ratio also depends on the value of k itself. Interestingly, maximum trade is not
necessarily attained at the lowest possible value of k, but there exists a value between the highest
and lowest at which this happens. The reason is that since clients and servers are interchangeable,
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extraction of surplus by a server is not always a bad thing from the client’s perspective, since it too
will gain when the roles are reversed. When the initial budget is low, a client is forced to take a
loan in order to bid a high value of k. But when it does so, it transfers a larger sum to the server,
which then (subtracting service cost), might be in a position to obtain service without having to
take a loan in the future (when it’s a client). Thus, aggregation of surplus at servers may not be
bad.
For evaluation, we first conduct numerical studies to illustrate the viability of our scheme and
compare the performance among the three systems: the hard-budget-constrained model, the bank-
loan model and the peer-loan model, in all of which agents alternate probabilistically between
being a client or a server. Comparative statics on trade ratios and optimal prices are studied in this
setting. In order to make the learnings concrete, we also conduct a case study on a synthetic grid
of Texas from the Electric Grid Test Case Repository [13, 14]. We utilize a data trace with per-bus
demand at each hour, estimate the available PV energy using weather data traces, inject power at
certain buses based on trade achieved in our (secondary) market, and determine the impact both
on the feasibility and on location marginal prices (LMPs) in the primary market (as obtained by
solving the Optimal Power Flow Problem in each hour). We show that even when injections to the
tune of 25% of the peak residential load occur, there is essentially no change to the LMPs and the
grid feasibility conditions are not violated. We then estimate the gains on a per agent (household
or small business) basis from using our market mechanism to be close to two hundred dollars a
year.
2.2 Mean Field Model
We consider a general model of the proposed market with a large number of agents. Each agent
maintains a private budget state and can bid any value within her budget plus some affordable loan
in the role of a client. The meaning of “affordable” will become clear when the value functions are
defined. When a client gets matched to a server, each places a bid. If the server indicates a lower
price than what the client proposes, a bilateral trade happens. At the end of a successful trade,
the client pays the server’s asking price together with the interest on any loan received, receives
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service and translates it into a dollar value surplus that directly increases her budget. Meanwhile,
the server receives the payment, and pays the cost of the providing service. Thus, the client will
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Figure 2.1: Mean Field Game
perfect Bayesian equilibria of such a system is complex, particularly when the number of agents
is large. Instead, we use a mean field approximation of the proposed market system, which has
proven to be an accurate representation when the number of agents is asymptotically large [6, 15].
Fig. 2.1 illustrates our mean field model from the perspective of a single agent.
At each discrete time step, an agent could either be a client or a server with fixed probabilities,
pc and ps, respectively. A client places a bid based on her belief of server’s bid distribution,
and vice versa. In addition to the client’s bid distribution, a server also maintains a belief of
client’s budget distribution conditional on the trade happening to evaluate the amount of interest
that she might gain through the loan. The conditional budget distribution can be obtained through
a re-normalization of the original budget distribution shifted by a constant, given the belief of
bid distributions. To simplify notation, we ignore this constant shift which induces no impact on
the following analysis, and use the notation of the original budget distribution instead. Note that
since clients and servers change roles, this is the same as a belief over a generic agent’s budget
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distribution, with a density function denoted by π̂. We assume that π̂ is continuous. Since the
number of the agents is large, which implies that both the number of clients and servers at any
instant are large as well, each individual can assume that her opponent’s bid is drawn independently
from the c.d.f. ρ̂c or ρ̂s, respectively. Then the complexity of the single agent decision making
problem is much reduced. In the rest of this section, we will provide a term-wise description of
our mean field model with the accompanying notation.
Time: Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, ...}.
Agent: At each time period t, an agent is either a client or a server, with probability pc or ps,
respectively. Note that the total number of agents is large and pc + ps = 1.
Bids: When a client is matched with a server, each places a bid, denoted as xc and xs, for the
client and server, respectively. When xc ≥ xs, the trade occurs and the client pays xs to the server.
State: Each agent keeps track of her budget, b, as a private state. At time t, the budget of a
agent is updated as following if a trade happens, i.e. xc ≥ xs,




s− xs − αc(xs − b[t])+, as a client w.p. pc
xs − cserve + αs(xs − B̂[t])+, as a server w.p. ps,
where B̂[t] is a random variable representing the budget of a contacted client, and is distributed
according to π̂. If a trade fails, i.e., xc < xs, then b[t+ 1] = b[t] for both agents.
Note that s represents the fixed dollar value surplus that a client gains from receiving service,
and cserve is the corresponding fixed cost that a server pays for providing service. Parameter αc is
the penalty term when a client overdraws on her budget, i.e., receives a loan from the peer server,
which is then paid back in full with interest after service is obtained and surplus is generated, and
αs is the return to the server. Here, both αc and αs are at least 1 with αs ≤ αc. For the hard budget
model αc = +∞ and αs = 1, and for the bank-model αs = 1 and αc > 1 with αc − 1 being the
bank’s interest rate. The support of the budget is R+ := [0,+∞).
Costs: We have already mentioned cserve, which is the server’s cost of providing service. In
addition, we introduce another cost, close, which denotes the cost of failure to obtain service as a
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client. This models an instantaneous dissatisfaction suffered by the client, but does not impact her
budget.
Regeneration: An agent may quit the system at the start of any time period t with probability
1 − β, and may stay with probability β ∈ (0, 1). We assume that a new agent enters the system
when an old agent leaves, and the budget of the new agent is drawn from a probability distribution
Ψ with a density on Binit that is a bounded subset of R+ (for simplicity).
Best Response Policy: As an agent participates in the system, she places bids at each time
period. Hence, she needs to solve a repeated decision making problem, given the private budget b,
the public belief about the bid distribution ρ̂ = [ρ̂c, ρ̂s] and the belief about the budget distribution
π̂. The probability of the trade happening can be computed for a given bid using the public belief
about her opponent’s bid distribution. This probability characterizes the next step transition of an
agent’s budget. Hence, a dynamic program is defined for an agent to find her best response policy,
θρ̂, as is shown in green/dark blocks of Fig. 2.1. We will discuss this in detail in section 2.3.
Stationary Distribution of Budget: Given the best response policy, the state transition of an
agent is described by equation (2.1) together with the regeneration, which forms the transition
kernel of a discrete-time Markov process. The stationary distribution of this Markov process, π, is
equivalent to the resulting budget distribution at the end of the lifetime of any given agent with the
public belief ρ̂ and π̂.
Mean Field Equilibrium: Given the assumed belief ρ̂ and π̂, solving the dynamic program,
the best response policy is obtained, which defines the kernel of the budget Markov process. There-
after, taking the stationary distribution of budget together with the best response of each state, a
new bid distribution γ(ρ̂) can be calculated. If γ(ρ̂) turns out to be the same as the public belief ρ̂,
the system is at an MFE. Detailed discussions of MFE can be found in Section 2.4. Note that there
are various ways to spread the public statistics ρ̂ and π̂ in practice, e.g., via mobile apps (see [16])
or a public website.
Discussion: While the above model is kept simple for purposes of exposition, more complex
phenomena can easily be added. For instance, the diurnal variation of weather causing client
12
and server interchange can be included by an additional Markovian state variable indicating if
the weather is sunny or overcast. Similarly, variable demand over the course of the day can be
included by considering a time-of-day mean field model as in [2]. Availability of storage too can be
incorporated with an additional state variable for the agents, whose value could also determine the
likelihood of being a client or a server in the current state. While surplus is chosen as deterministic
in the above model, we expect similar results to hold with stochastic surplus. Given that one unit
of energy is being shared through one trade in the current setup, an opportunistic way to deal
with variable surplus is by conducting multiple trades upon request. Behavior with all of these
extensions will be more complex, since we would have to include a belief on the additional state
variables, and an expectation by the servers of a trade only yielding partial returns. However, the
feasibility of the simplest scenario then opens up the possibility of studying these generalizations.
While the technical reason for regeneration is to ensure correlation decay leading to asymptotic
independence of client and server budgets [15], it also models real behavior of agents such as
moving to a new house, changing utility providers, PV system maintenance, etc. Also, in our
current regeneration scheme, we keep the total number of agents being constant over time, which
is not necessary in the mean field model. Instead, only the average number of agents needs to be
stationary in order to show the stationarity of the budget. Finally, our analysis assumes that mixing
happens fast enough that stationary regime analysis is accurate in the current time-block and the
resource utilization could be maximized with little regularity. Our experiments in Sections 2.5 and
2.6 show that the required mixing indeed holds, even for large instances. In particular, the case
study that is based on a data trace does have hour-by-hour changes in the weather, and accounts
for this variation at each step. Beliefs converge even under this setup, which indicates robustness
of the approach.
2.3 Best Response Policy
We first introduce a few easily established facts regarding equilibrium behavior of the agents.
Here, we consider agents bidding discrete values in R+. Later, we will show a specific class of
highly efficient equilibria exists, in which all servers bid a single price while clients either accept
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or reject. We further define random variables X̃s and X̃c distributed according to ρ̂s and ρ̂c, and
the corresponding p.m.f. are pX̃s and pX̃c . Suppose the bid spaces of clients and servers are upper
bounded by x̄c and x̄s, we have following:
Fact 1. Given ρ̂s, a client should never bid higher than x̄s, where x̄s is the upper-end of the support
of ρ̂s, i.e., ρ̂s(xs) = 1 ∀xs ≥ x̄s and ρ̂s(xs) < 1 ∀xs < x̄s.
Fact 2. Given ρ̂c, a server should never bid higher than x̄c, where x̄c is the upper-end of the support
of ρ̂c, i.e., ρ̂c(xc) = 1 ∀xc ≥ x̄c and ρ̂c(xc) < 1 ∀xc < x̄c.
Fact 3. Given pX̃s , a client should never bid xc for xc > 0 such that pX̃s(xc) = 0.
Fact 4. Given pX̃c , a server should never bid xs such that pX̃c(xs) = 0.
These facts hold since the violation each of them yields a non-positive expected payoff to a
generic agent. Thus, we claim that if an equilibrium exists, which we will discuss in section 2.4,
then in each equilibrium, by Fact 1 and 2, we have x̄s = x̄c, meanwhile, by Fact 3 and 4, we
have the action space of an agent in each role has the same discrete support, denoted as D ⊂ R+,
with the corresponding beliefs. Furthermore, the number of clients and servers are not required
to be the same in our setup. The mismatched cases can be absorbed by the extreme values of
the corresponding support. If there are more servers than clients, then a server will have certain
extra probability to see a client bidding zero. In the opposite case, a client will see an increased
probability of servers bidding the upper bound. The existence of such boundaries in the action
space is shown later in Lemma 1.
2.3.1 Value Function
As we discussed in section 2.2, the repeated decision making problem for a single agent (with
a geometrically distributed lifetime) forms a discounted cost dynamic program. The agent plays
two roles (client or server) probabilistically over its lifetime. In each role, the agent encounter-
s a different decision making problem, but based on its private budget that is common to both
roles. Throughout, we will track a generic agent just before her role (client or server) is revealed.
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However, as an agent takes an action (bids) only after her role is revealed, this is consistent with
our set-up mentioned in Section 2.2. Hence, we define the Bellman equation associated with the
dynamic program of interest as follows:
















where x̃s and x̃c are realizations of random variables, X̃s and X̃c, and vρ̂,π̂(·) is the value function of
a generic agent, which is in turn composed of an average of vs(·) and vc(·) (value functions once her
role is revealed). Also αs = αc = α for ease of exposition. Since each agent’s role is determined
exogenously at the beginning of a time period, the evolution of both vs(·) and vc(·) depends on
vρ̂,π̂(·) so that (2.1) remains consistent. We believe that the exogenously driven role choice makes
this a natural assumption. Since the role of the agent in our context is usually determined by the
external environment, the value of currency should be determined by the underlying market and
not the role one’s currently playing.
In our model, a client is allowed to overdraw her budget with an upper limit such that the
budget does not end up negative after any possible transaction, i.e. a client is allowed to choose up
to the maximum value of xc subject to (b + s − xc − α(xc − b)+) being non-negative. A simple
calculation then yields the upper limit of a client’s bid as b + s/(1 + α). As mentioned earlier,
the interest that a server may gain through the peer loan depends on the realized budget of the
peer client, denoted by b̂ (drawn according to π̂). Also, for both clients and servers, when a trade
happens, a budget update as well as an instantaneous gain in value is induced, which captures the
fact that the trade generates value both in the present and in the future. Further, notice that the
expectation of the indicator functions in equation (2.1) can be determined using the probability of
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(1− ρ̂c(xs))(β(Eπ̂[vρ̂,π̂(b+ xs − cserve + α(xs − B̂)+)]











− x̃s − α(x̃s − b)+) + s− x̃s
)
+ (1− ρ̂s(xc))(βvρ̂,π̂(b)− close)
])
= βvρ̂,π̂(b) + max
(xs,xc)∈A(b)
([
ps(1− ρ̂c(xs))(xs − cserve) + pc
(





ps(1− ρ̂c(xs))∆vs(b, xs, cserve, π̂) + pc
xc∑
x̃s=0





A(b) is the two dimensional bid space D ×D ∩ [0, b+ s/(1 + α)],
∆vs(b, xs, cserve, π̂) =
∫∞
0
π̂(b̂)vρ̂,π̂(b+xs−cserve+α(xs− b̂)+)db̂−vρ̂,π̂(b), and ∆vc(b, s, x̃s, α) =
vρ̂,π̂(b+ s− x̃s−α(x̃s− b)+)− vρ̂,π̂(b). Where we have used the fact that π̂ is the density function
of (belief) budget of an agent and the latter two functions account for the change in value with a
trade for a server and a client, respectively. Then, the space of possible value functions is
V = {f : (R+ → R) : ‖f‖∞ <∞} = L∞.
Define the Bellman operator Tρ̂,π̂ on L∞ as below:
(Tρ̂,π̂f)(b)
= βf(b) + max
(xs,xc)∈A(b)
((
ps(1− ρ̂c(xs))(xs − cserve) + pc
(





ps(1− ρ̂c(xs))∆fs(b, xs, cserve, π̂) + pc
xc∑
x̃s=0





∆fs(b, xs, cserve, π̂) =
∫∞
0
π̂(b̂)f(b+ xs − cserve + α(xs − b̂)+)db̂− f(b),
∆fc(b, s, x̃s, α) = f(b+ s− x̃s − α(x̃s − b)+)− f(b).
2.3.2 Properties of the Value Function
In order to characterize the best response policy, we need to derive some useful properties of
the value function vρ̂,π̂. We start by proving the convergence of value iteration for the Bellman
operator Tρ̂,π̂(·). This follows immediately from classical results in [17], as long as we can prove
the following three lemmas. Define the transition kernel Q(B|b, (xs, xc)) for non-empty Borel
subset B ⊂ R+ by equation (2.1) together with the regeneration. Note that given xs, xc, the
probability of trade happening can be directly calculated through ρ̂.
Lemma 1. For every state b ∈ R+,
1) There exists an effective bid space Â(b), which is compact;
2) The reward-per-stage is lower semi-continuous in (xs, xc);
3) The function µ(b, xs, xc) := EQ[u(B)|b, (xs, xc)] is continuous in (xs, xc) ∈ Â(b) for every
function u ∈ V .
Proof. The proof of 1) follows from showing the existence of upper bounds on bids for both
client and server yielding Â(b). The reward-per-stage in (2.3) is defined as c(b, (xs, xc)) , ps(1−
ρ̂c(xs))(xs − cserve) + pc
(
ρ̂s(xc)(s− E[X̃s|X̃s ≤ xc])− (1− ρ̂s(xc))close
)
and given b, xs, xc, the
kernel Q is fully determined by ps, pc, ρ̂, π̂,Ψ. The continuity of Q over the discrete topology of
Â(b) is natural. Details of this proof are available in Appendix.
Lemma 2. There exist constants ξ ≥ 0 and η ≥ 0 with 1 ≤ η < 1/β, and a function w ≥ 1 s.t.
for every state b
1) supA(b) |c(b, (xs, xc))| ≤ ξw(b); and
2) supA(b) EQ[w(B)|b, (xs, xc)] ≤ ηw(b).
Lemma 3. For every state (b), the function ω(b, xs, xc) := EQ[w(B)|b, (xs, xc)] is continuous in
(xs, xc) ∈ Â(x).
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Proof. Since cserve, s and close are fixed, c(b, (xs, xc)) is bounded. Then taking a bounded function
w, with the continuity of Q, the results in Lemma 2 and 3 are straightforward.
Theorem 1. (Hernandez-Lerma [17]) Given the belief ρ̂s, ρ̂c, π̂ and the corresponding p.m.f. pX̃s , pX̃c
we have,
1) There exists a j ∈ N such that T jρ̂,π̂ : V → V is a contraction mapping. Hence, there exists a
unique f ∗ρ̂,π̂ ∈ V such that Tρ̂,π̂f ∗ρ̂,π̂ = f ∗ρ̂,π̂, and for any f ∈ V , T nρ̂,π̂f → f ∗ρ̂,π̂ as n→∞.




Lemma 4. v∗ρ̂,π̂(b) is monotonically increasing in b.
Proof. By Theorem 1, we have proved vρ̂,π̂ converges to a unique fixed point v∗ρ̂,π̂ over Tρ̂,π̂. Thus,
it is sufficient to prove that Tρ̂,π̂ maintains the assumed monotonicity. Full details of the proof are
presented in Appendix.
2.3.3 Best Response Policy Characterization
As discussed in Section 2.2, our goal is to maximize server utilization from the system per-
spective, which is equivalent to maximizing the expected trade ratio in the market. Furthermore,
the budget, which is defined through equation (2.1), increases through successful trade. These
observations imply that we should characterize the best response policy not only from the single
agent perspective, but also from the perspective of maximizing the expected trade ratio. We will
use this goal to motivate a specific family of equilibria for our problem. Given the four facts we
discussed at the beginning of this section, we then show that for the best system performance a
certain simpler class of bidding functions suffice.
Lemma 5. All servers bidding the same price within the clients’ affordable range maximizes the
expected trade ratio.
Proof. The proof follows from comparing the trade ratios between the scenarios in which the server
places multiple bids or a single bid. Using the four facts, the corresponding client bid distributions
can be further characterized. Full details are available in Appendix.
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Motivated by Lemma 5, we characterize the best response policy by initializing the belief of
server’s bid distribution to be pX̃s(k) = 1 for some fixed k, i.e. all servers bid the same price k. For
non-trivial behavior k ≥ cserve, but k can be higher than s, though not by much, i.e. s− k ≥ close,
otherwise, the trade will become worthless; see section 2.5 for the latter.
2.3.3.1 Client’s Best Response





− α(k − b)+)) + s− k) + 1xc<k(βvρ̂,π̂(b)− close)
)
By Facts 1 and 3, we conclude that the client will bid either 0 or k. If a client bids k, the trade will
happen w.p. 1, and will fail otherwise. We define the following useful terms:
vc_win(b) = β(v
∗
ρ̂,π̂(b+ s− k − α(k − b)+)) + s− k,
vc_lose(b) = βv
∗
ρ̂,π̂(b)− close, bc_win = b+ s− k − α(k − b)+, and bc_lose = b.
Since the budget can never go negative, we have an upper limit on a client’s bid of b+s/(1+α).
If k lies out of this range, the client will simply bid 0. Now, from Lemma 4, bc_win ≥ bc_lose i.e.
b ≥ ((1 +α)k− s)/α = k− s−k
α
implies that if vc_win(b) ≥ vc_lose(b), then the client should bid k.
Thus, we have a lower bound on the bid as 0, and the upper bound as k. The exact bidding strategy
depends on the relationship between vc_win(b) and vc_lose(b). A summary of the best responses of





0 b ∈ [0, k − s
1+α
)
0 if vc_win(b) ≤ vc_lose(b) b ∈ [k − s1+α , k − s−kα ]
k if vc_win(b) ≥ vc_lose(b) b ∈ [k − s1+α , k − s−kα ]




Note that when k < s/(1 + α), all clients will bid k, which is an extreme case of a “cheap
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resource." It implies the price one needs to pay is too low, as compared to the gain from the trade.
We further characterize the best response function θc,ρ̂(b) in the following Lemma.
Lemma 6. θc,ρ̂(b) is piecewise constant on [0, k − s−kα ] with a finite number of constant intervals.
Proof. The proof follows by showing the difference vc_win(b)− vc_lose(b) is of bounded total vari-
ation. Full details are available in Appendix.
2.3.3.2 Server’s Best Response
Given the client’s best response function, we observe that under certain circumstances, the
client will bid either 0 or k based on her private state. By Facts 2 and 4, we conclude that the server
will again bid either 0 or k. We can refine the server’s belief about the client’s bid distribution as
pX̃c = (ẑ, 1− ẑ), where ẑ = P(X̃c = 0). Then vs(b) = (1− ẑ)(Eπ̂[βvẑ,π̂(b+ xs− cserve + α(xs−
B̂)+)] + xs − cserve) + ẑβvẑ,π̂(b). By Lemma 4, for ∀b ∈ R+, we have vs(b) is monotonically
increasing in xs, when xs ≤ k. Hence, all servers will bid k.
Given a feasible k (which we refer to as a “unified price” for both clients and servers), the
discussion above lends credence to the existence of an equilibrium over the simple set of beliefs
given by ẑ, π̂. We will prove that such Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) indeed exists in section 2.4.
2.4 Mean Field Equilibrium
The main result of this section is to show the existence of an MFE with under simple bidding
strategies. Given the unified price k and the (belief) probability of bidding 0 as a client, ẑ, and the
belief of the budget distribution π̂, the kernel of state transitions in (2.1) is well defined. Denote
the fixed point value function as v∗ẑ,π̂. Taking the best response of client using (2.4), we have the






b[t] w.p. β(psẑ + pc1b[t]∈B0)
b[t] + s− k − α(k − b[t])+ w.p. βpc1b[t]∈R+\B0
b[t] + k − cserve + α(k − b̂[t])+ w.p. βπ̂(b̂[t])ps(1− ẑ)
Binit w.p. (1− β)Ψ(Binit)
(2.5)
where, B0 ⊂ R+, in which the agents bid 0 as a client, and Ψ is the probability measure of the
agent regeneration process. Set Binit ⊆ R+ is the set of possible budgets with regeneration. When
b[t] lies on the boundaries of B0, by Lemma 6, a client is indifferent to bidding 0 or k. Also, the
number of these boundary points in B0 is finite, which leads to a Borel-null set in B0. Hence,
w.l.o.g. adding these points by assuming the client will bid 0 with some probability ptie and k with
the complementary probability will not alter the proofs in the rest of this section.
Observe that from (2.5), given the current state b[t], the next state b[t+ 1] is independent of the
rest of the history. Thus, the transition kernel above defines a Markov process for the budget, and
we have following Lemma.
Lemma 7. The Markov process {b[t]}∞t=0 with transition kernel (2.5) is positive recurrent and has
a unique stationary distribution, π = Π(ẑ, π̂), where Π(.) is used to denote the mapping between
[ẑ, π̂] and π. Furthermore, given ẑ and π̂, π is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure on
R+.
Proof. The proof of the first statement follows by showing that the one-step transition function
satisfies the Doeblin condition, then using the results in [18, Chap. 12]. Then we derive the
relationship between π(B) and π(τ)(B|b), where τ is the first regeneration time after t = 0 and
b(0) = b to prove the second statement. Details are in Appendix.
The best response of each state θẑ yields a resultant budget distribution with density π and a
new value z. If π = π̂ and z = ẑ, then we say the system is at an MFE. The main result of this
section is to prove the following theorem, where θc,ẑ(·) is the set-valued (subset of {0, k}) function
21
of client bids as a function of its budget. More formally, θc,ẑ : R+ → {0, k} is the client’s best
response correspondence which maps the budget to a binary choice of bids, either 0 or k.
Theorem 2. Define γ(ẑ, π̂) , πẑ,π̂(θ−1c,ẑ (0)),∀ẑ ∈ [0, 1], where θ−1c,ẑ (0) is the lower inverse of θc,ẑ(·)
at 0. There exists an MFE (z, k, θẑ, π), such that π = Π(ẑ, π̂) and z = γ(ẑ, π̂).
To prove Theorem 2, we need to show that γ(·) and Π(·) have a fixed point, i.e., γ(z, π) = z
and Π(z, π) = π for some z ∈ [0, 1] and some (continuous) probability density π on R+. We use
the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem, which requires that γ(·) and Π(·) are continuous in ẑ and π̂,
and that the closure of their range spaces are compact.
It is straightforward to show that Π(.) is a continuous map. Now, from Section 2.3 the best
response function θc,ẑ(·) is a set-valued function with a range containing all non-empty subsets of
{0, k}. Then we show θc,ẑ(·) is upper hemicontinuous in ẑ, and combine with the continuity of π.
Finally, we prove the single point inverse (lower inverse) of the upper hemicontinuous set-valued
function θc,ẑ(·) is a subset that consists of finite number of continuous pieces, which leads to the
continuity of γ(·).
Now, ẑ lies in the closed interval [0, 1], which is compact and convex. We then consider the
range of the mapping Π. Now, R+ is a σ−compact metric space, and since Π is a continuous real
valued function, it can be easily shown that the closure of the image of the mapping Π is compact
in the norm space of π̂ directly using Theorem 13 in [19]. This completes the requirements of the
Schauder Fixed Point Theorem. The steps of the proof are given below.
Lemma 8. v∗ẑ,π̂ is Lipschitz continuous in π̂ and in ẑ.
Proof. The proof follows using the properties of the contraction mapping T jẑ,π̂ in Theorem 1. De-
tails are presented in Appendix.
Theorem 3. θc,ẑ(·) is upper hemicontinuous in ẑ.
Proof. Given ẑ and k, we can rewrite v∗ẑ,π̂ in a different way such that it can be represented as
a increasing piecewise linear convex function. The proof holds by applying Berge’s Maximum
Theorem. Details are presented in Appendix.
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Theorem 4. Π(ẑ, π̂) is continuous in π̂ and ẑ.
Proof. The key idea of the proof is using the Portmanteau Theorem to show for any uniform
converging sequence ẑn → ẑ, a sequence of density functions π̂n → π̂ and any open set B,
lim infn→∞ πn(B) ≥ π(B), where πn = Π(ẑn, π̂n) and π = Π(ẑ, π̂). Details are presented in
Appendix.
Theorem 5. γ(ẑ) , πẑ,π̂(θ−1c,ẑ (0)) is continuous in ẑ.
Proof. We prove this by showing that θ−1c,ẑ (0) is a continuity set for πẑ,π̂. See Appendix for details.
2.5 Simulation
Here we conduct Monte Carlo simulations of all three models of our market system with one
million virtual agents.
Before presenting simulation results, we first introduce the parameter settings. We use a regen-
eration factor β = 0.98; we assume that agents have an equal probability being clients and servers,
i.e., ps = pc = 0.5; α = 1.1, which is the penalty parameter for overdraft; s = 8 and cserve = 6
make the trade generate reasonable amount of value; close = 0.5 captures the client disappointment
when the trade fails; Ψ(Binit) = U [0, 5], new agents come with limited amount of budget, which
helps us better analyze the differences among three models; and price k = 7 in order to balance
the benefits between servers and clients through the trade. Later on in this section, we will show
how different prices and initial budgets affect the equilibrium trade ratio in the bank-loan model.
Fig. 2.2 shows the convergence of the MFE bid probability belief, z. In the hard constraint
model, clients cannot afford the price k = 7, so all clients bid 0 and the system freezes. However,
in the bank-loan model and peer-loan model, the system gradually ramps up through different
borrowing mechanisms and z dramatically reduces when the system attains more and more wealth
through successful trades. Fig. 2.3 presents the CDFs of budget at MFE across the three models,
which indicates agents are wealthier in the peer-loan model than in the bank-loan model at MFE
(as the bank extracts some of the surplus), while the budget distribution is similar to the initial
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Figure 2.2: Convergence of
the belief, z. Reprinted with
permission from [1].














Figure 2.3: CDF of budget at


























Figure 2.4: Client bid dis-
tribution at MFE. Reprinted
with permission from [1].


































Figure 2.5: Bank-loan mod-
el: trade ratio and expect-
ed value vs. k, Ψ(Binit) =
U [0, 5]. Reprinted with per-
mission from [1].


































Figure 2.6: Bank-loan mod-
el: trade ratio and expect-
ed value vs. k, Ψ(Binit) =
U [3, 8]. Reprinted with per-
mission from [1].








































Figure 2.7: Bank-loan mod-
el: trade ratio and expect-
ed value vs. k, Ψ(Binit) =
U [5, 10]. Reprinted with per-
mission from [1].


































Figure 2.8: Peer-loan model:
trade ratio and expected value
vs. k, Ψ(Binit) = U [0, 5]


































Figure 2.9: Peer-loan model:
trade ratio and expected value
vs. k, Ψ(Binit) = U [3, 8]


































Figure 2.10: Peer-loan mod-
el: trade ratio and expect-
ed value vs. k, Ψ(Binit) =
U [5, 10]
values in the hard constraint model. Fig. 2.4 shows the binary bid distributions of clients at MFE,
which verifies the results in Section 2.3. We further evaluate two important statistics, namely the
trade ratio and the expected value in Table 2.1, where the expected value is calculated according to
EΨ(Binit)[v∗MFE]. As we mentioned earlier, the higher the trade ratio the market system achieves,
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Table 2.1: Trade Ratio and Expected Value. Reprinted with permission from [1].
Initial Budget Ψ(Binit) = U [0, 5] Ψ(Binit) = U [5, 10]
Model Hard Bank Peer Hard Bank Peer
Trade Ratio 0% 84.3% 85.2% 97.7% 99.4% 99.5%
Value -12.49 40.14 41.74 48.53 49.6 49.7
the higher resource utilization it ends up with. Given the unified bid of server and binary bids of
client, the expected trade ratio is captured by 1−z at MFE. The empirical trade ratio among the one
million agents matches this quantity in all cases. Intuitively, a higher trade ratio implies a higher
expected value, which is verified in Table 2.1. For the sake of comparison, we also append the
results of sufficient initial budget case, i.e. Ψ(Binit) = U [5, 10], in Table 2.1 as well. We observe
that with a sufficient initial budget, the hard constraint model also achieves a reasonably high trade
ratio at MFE, and the statistics of bank-loan model catches up with the peer-loan model, and both
reach 100% trade ratio.
In the simulations above, we set the unified price k = 7 and the initial budget, Binit, to be
uniform distributed in [0, 5]. Next, we will show how these two attributes affect the trade ratio of
the market system. Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 illustrate the trade ratio and the corre-
sponding expected value versus different unified prices with different initial budget distributions
under the bank-loan and peer-loan models. Recall that s = 8 and cserve = 6, which means that
the reasonable range of k lies in [6, 8 + ε], given the client is allowed to overdraw his budget to
some extent. We observe that for Binit in [0, 5], the trade ratio increases in k; for Binit in [3, 8],
the trade ratio first increases then decreases; for Binit in [5, 10], the trade ratio decreases in k. An
intuitive explanation of these results is as follows. When most agents have a sufficient budget,
lower price yields higher trade ratio. However, when most agents have a limited budget, it is better
to set higher prices to aggregate the wealth at fewer agents, which then can obtain service without
taking a loan from the bank or the peer server. It is interesting to note that in the bank-loan model,
the expected value follows the corresponding trend in trade ratio, whereas in the peer-loan model,
maximum value and maximum trade do not correspond. The reason for this is the interest received
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by the server in the peer-model makes up for the lack of a high trade ratio at low prices.
2.6 Case Study: Photovoltaic Market
We consider a PV energy sharing market in which the agents could be householders or smal-
l business owners. During the hours with high sunshine, the system can supply the electricity
consumption of an agent. Moreover, it generates extra energy that can be fed back to the grid.
However, in rainy or overcast weather, solar panels only produce 10%-25% of their rated capaci-
ty [20]. This creates the opportunity to share the extra solar energy between locations with good
and bad weather.
However, electricity is a product that is hard to differentiate between different producers. In
our context, one cannot identify specific electron transactions between matched servers and clients.
However, since we build our market on top of the existing grid, servers inject power into the grid
and clients demand power from the grid. This gives us the flexibility of conducting trades between
any set of locations that are connected on the grid. For our case study, we pick two such cities,
Dallas and Houston, since both belong to Texas interconnection and are also associated with retail
competition.
To validate the model on a realistic system, we conduct our market on a 2000-bus synthetic
Texas grid [14] built using publicly available data of the actual U.S. transmission system in 2016,
the topology of which is shown in Fig 2.11. Collecting hourly historical weather data of the two
cities in 2016 from [21], we found that approximately 38% of the time, both cities have sunny
days, and about 20% of the time, both have cloudy days (hence do not need the market).
We are interested in situations in which the two cities have different weather so that they
could share energy. The probabilities of these events are 0.1 (Dallas-bad, Houston-good) and
0.32 (Dallas-good, Houston-bad). Normalizing these values, we obtain two type of agents: Dallas
agents that are clients about 23% of the time and are servers 77% of the time, and Houston agents
who are exactly the opposite. Given the heterogeneous agent types, we have a slightly different
setup from the previous section with homogeneous agents. Also, given the regional weather effect-
s, all Dallas agents are of one type, while all Houston agents are of another type. We will show the
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Figure 2.11: Synthetic Texas
Grid
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Figure 2.13: Peer-Loan mod-
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Figure 2.14: Peer-Loan mod-
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convergence of the coupling beliefs and the consistency of budget distributions across agent types
under the chosen market price, k. The setting resembles the one in [22], with multiple agent types
that undergo exogenous changes.
We choose parameters for our analysis based on readily available data. As we discussed above,
ps and pc for Dallas (Houston) agents are 77%(23%) and 23%(77%) respectively. Given the aver-
age electricity price to be 10 cents/kwh, we set the value of surplus s = 10. However, an accurate
unit cost for rooftop solar energy is not well established, since it varies by the installation fee,
the maintenance fee, the government subsidy, etc., and we use 5 cents/kwh as a conservative es-
timate [23], which yields cserve = 5. We choose the unified price k = 7.5 to balance the benefits
of the trade between clients and servers. A sufficient budget initialization Ψ(Binit) = U [5, 10] is
used.
Fig. 2.12 shows the convergence of the coupled beliefs in loan model. We see that the agents
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quickly get involved in trades, since the peer-loan ramps up the system fast.Also, the higher prob-
ability of being a client for Houston agents makes their value of budget lower, which is shown in
Fig. 2.13. Fig. 2.14 illustrates the consistency of budget distributions between agent types. With
the balanced price chosen, the consistency of budget distributions implies a high trade ratio. In-
deed, the trade ratio turns out to be 99.9%, which matches our discussion of the sufficient budget
case in Section 2.5.
We next determine the feasibility of our system operating in conjunction with the existing
(primary) market, whose bus-prices are determined by the solution of the DC optimal power flow
(OPF) solution with a given demand. Hence, we first determine the baseline location marginal
prices (LMPs) when only the primary market exists, and compare with the situation that arises
under significant penetration of the our A2S (secondary) market. The physical impact of our
secondary market is to inject power at certain buses, and we aim to determine both the feasibility
of doing so without violating grid constrains, as well as the impact on the LMPs in the primary
market. Thus, we compare the DC optimal power flow (OPF) solution of the original network
(baseline) with the case when around one million customers from the two cities (split equally) are
involved in our market with different trade ratios.
The average rooftop PV system size in the U.S. is 5kW [24]. Given that the average electricity
usage is roughly 2.5kWh per hour in the daytime [25], a server is able to provide 2.5kWh extra
energy with one hour full sunshine, which is sufficient to supply a typical client. This implies
roughly 1250MWh maximum extra energy injection at servers’ buses when scaled by one million
participants. Fig 2.15 and 2.16 explicitly show the maximum LMP fluctuations are below 10% of
the value of the baseline LMP ($19.6/MWh) when different amounts of energy are traded. Further
notice that the potential energy penetration through the grid due to the market here is 5000MWh
(5kWh∗1 million), which is roughly one quarter of the residential load of the entire Texas system
in a typical peak hour during 2016. Thus, the secondary market is both physically possible, and
has minimal disruption on existing markets even with significant penetration.
Finally, we evaluate our market system using weather traces in the year 2016 [21]. We con-
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servatively define daytime to be the interval between one hour after sunrise to one hour before
sunset, and found that in 1379 time periods (hours) a Houston agent is a client, whereas in 402
time periods a Dallas agent is a client. One potentially saves (1379∗ (10−7.5) + 402∗ (7.5−5))∗
2.5/100 ∗ 99.9% ≈ $111.3/year through our market. Note that the price k is chosen to balance
the benefits of the trade, so the savings are consistent between different types of agents. However,
for a Net Meter user, the grid usually pays at the rate 5¢/kwh [26], which gives zero profit as a
server and deficits as a client, i.e. −1379 ∗ 10/100 = −$137.9/year for an Houston agent and
−402∗10/100 = −$40.2/year for an Dallas agent. The effective returns from the market are thus
$249.2 and $151.5 for the two agent types, respectively.
2.7 Extension
So far we have discussed the market system between two locations and showed the operation
point of the underlying power grid will not deviate too much even with large amount of energy
being traded. However, the power grid is a large scale networked system with thousands of buses
connected with each other. One geographic location often imply one bus in power system. Even
for big cities, several buses could handle the transmission requirement. What if we scale our
secondary market across the grid? With large group of agents in multiple locations participating
into the market and trading simultaneously with each other based on different weather conditions,
the overall extra transmissions due to the market may exceed the threshold of current operation
point and cause significant changes in LMPs, which is not observed in Fig 2.15 and 2.16.
In this section, we first show the possibility of changing LMPs dramatically by injecting cheap
PV energy to the network through a simple three bus case. Then we briefly describe the results
in [27], which describes the polyhedral structure of LMP. Finally, we introduce a possible extension
of our proposed market to price anticipating scenarios based on the geometry of LMPs.
2.7.1 A Three-Bus Example
Fig 2.17 shows a three-bus system with one traditional generator on each bus. The maximum
capacity of all traditional generators are 450MW . The cost curves are linear but different among
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generators. A load l = 360MW is attached to bus 3. The impedance of all three transmission
lines are the same, however, there is a capacity limit on the transmission line between bus 2 and
bus 3. We set this capacity limit to be 150MW + ε for the purpose of showing the boundary case
explicitly. Suppose a PV generator is installed on bus 2, of which the power output is stochastic
based on different whether conditions.
If there is no injection for the PV generator, the DC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is shown in
blue text. In this case, generator g1 takes care of all the demand and LMP1 = LMP2 = LMP3 =
$10/MWh, which is the marginal cost of g1. The system reaches a boundary point when the PV
injection equals to 90MW , the OPF of which is shown in yellow text. When the PV injection
is beyond 90MW , we solve the OPF with ε = 0.5 and get LMP1 = $10/MWh,LMP2 =
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Figure 2.17: A three bus example
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2.7.2 The Geometry of Locational Marginal Prices
Although the LMPs may vary due to extra power injection, it is not intractable. It is shown
in [27] that the state-space of a power system represented by a DC power flow model can be
partitioned into polyhedral price regions in which the LMPs are constant. Here, we use a simple
two bus example as shown in Fig 2.18 to illustrate the idea. In this two bus network, we have two
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Fig. 1. Two bus network
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Fig. 2. Load set for the linear case
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Fig. 3. Load set for the quadratic case









While the formulation presented so far is relatively abstract,
the closed form expressions for LMPs, and the geometric
concept of congestion sets can have many applications. For
example the LMP expression could be used in bi-level op-
timization programs, of which many examples arise in the
power systems literature. Here we present an application of
congestion sets to illustrate the potential of load flexibility
to eliminate congestion in transmission networks and provide
economic benefits for market participants.
A. Load Flexibiity for Congestion Free Dispatch
Load flexibility is considered essential for the development
of the smart grid. We take a broader definition of load flexibil-
ity to encompass both temporal demand response and energy
storage. Promising applications include frequency regulation,
peak load reduction, reserve capacity, volt/var control, and
crucially facilitating increased penetration of renewables and
distributed generation on the grid [23], [24], [25].
Another such application of load flexibility is congestion
mitigation. Due to out of merit order generation dispatch,
congestion causes prices to vary and typically increase across
a network, usually resulting in wealth transfers away from
end consumers. For instance, from 2008-2013, between 2
and 6% of PJM’s total annual billing was attributable to
congestion, representing an average annual cost of approxi-
mately $1bn [26].4 It may be desirable for the loads to avoid
congestion in the network so as to reduce their costs.
If we examine the congestion free sets in the two-bus
example, shown in blue in Figures 2, 3, we see that whilst
the individual sets S1, S2, are convex, their union is non-
convex. This suggests that if we could use flexibility to move
the load vector, we might be able to eliminate congestion for
4Specifically this figure refers to the congestion component of LMPs
some loads. We illustrate this idea using a simple example,
building on the two-bus case with linear generation costs.
We will define three loads, shown in Fig. 4. The red
triangular area in Fig. 4 is the set S3 ∩ conv(S1 ∪ S2), where
conv(S) denotes the convex hull of S.
l(1) =
(
X − α(G1 − C)










l(3) = (X,Y ) ∈ S3 ∩ conv(S1 ∪ S2)
= (1− α)l(1) + αl(2)
where α ∈ (0, 1), and bd(S) denotes the boundary of the
set S. l(3) is an arbitrary point in the congested load set
S3 ∩ conv(S1 ∪ S2), with coordinates (X,Y ). l(3) also lies
on the line segment connecting l(1) and l(2). This suggests
that if l(3) is constant over some time period, it can be met
congestion free using flexibility. In other words suppose we
need to serve a constant load l(3) over some time period T .
Since l(3) cannot be served without congesting the network,
suppose the loads admit flexibility and we dispatch l(1) over
a time period (1− α)T and l(2) over a time period αT . This
results in a congestion free dispatch.
Scenario (1− α)T αT Congestion free
Non-flexible l(3) l(3) No
Flexible l(1) l(2) Yes
To demonstrate the economic effects of a flexible and
congestion free dispatch, we consider each class of market
participants as a collective and calculate the system cost
(SC),5 the generation revenue (GR), the load payment (LP ),
and the merchandising surplus (MS) resulting from each
scenario. The MS is the surplus collected by the system
operator after paying all generators and receiving all payments
from loads, MS = LP − GR. It should be noted that the
MS is zero in the absence of congestion. We denote the non-
flexible scenario (n), and the flexible scenario (f), and we
5This is the value of the objective function solved by the system operator
i.e. the fuel cost of the generators.
Figure 2.18: A two bus network
generators g1 and g2 on bus 1 and bus 2 with maximum generation capacityG1 andG2 respectively.
Again the cost curves are linear and the marginal cost f g1 is smaller than g2. The loads are l1 and
l2. The line capacity is C, assuming C < Gi. Given the setup, the feasible load set is shown in Fig
2.19. According to the DC OPF solutions, the LMPs on the two buses turn out to be constant within
the three regions S1, S2 and S3. Specifically, in region S3, the transmission line is congested. One
could further derive the closed form expressions for the LMPs in each region. The technical details
regarding this work refer to [27].
2.7.3 Market Model Extension
Given the geometry of LMPs discussed in previous section, it is possible to extend our market
model into a more general system, in which agents from different locations share their extra PV
generation across the Smart Grid. Our current market model assumes the system operates in a
single polyhedral region of LMP, i.e. agents are price taking. However, the transitions between
different LMP regions can be fully captured by the trade ratios among different locations, which
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Fig. 3. Load set for the quadratic case









While the formulation presented so far is relatively abstract,
the closed form expressions for LMPs, and the geometric
concept of congestion sets can have many applications. For
example the LMP expression could be used in bi-level op-
timization programs, of which many examples arise in the
power systems literature. Here we present an application of
congestion sets to illustrate the potential of load flexibility
to eliminate congestion in transmission networks and provide
economic benefits for market participants.
A. Load Flexibiity for Congestion Free Dispatch
Load flexibility is considered essential for the development
of the smart grid. We take a broader definition of load flexibil-
ity to encompass both temporal demand response and energy
storage. Promising applications include frequency regulation,
peak load reduction, reserve capacity, volt/var control, and
crucially facilitating increased penetration of renewables and
distributed generation on the grid [23], [24], [25].
Another such application of load flexibility is congestion
mitigation. Due to out of merit order generation dispatch,
congestion causes prices to vary and typically increase across
a network, usually resulting in wealth transfers away from
end consumers. For instance, from 2008-2013, between 2
and 6% of PJM’s total annual billing was attributable to
congestion, representing an average annual cost of approxi-
mately $1bn [26].4 It may be desirable for the loads to avoid
congestion in the network so as to reduce their costs.
If we examine the congestion free sets in the two-bus
example, shown in blue in Figures 2, 3, we see that whilst
the individual sets S1, S2, are convex, their union is non-
convex. This suggests that if we could use flexibility to move
the load vector, we might be able to eliminate congestion for
4Specifically this figure refers to the congestion component of LMPs
some loads. We illustrate this idea using a simple example,
building on the two-bus case with linear generation costs.
We will define three loads, shown in Fig. 4. The red
triangular area in Fig. 4 is the set S3 ∩ conv(S1 ∪ S2), where
conv(S) denotes the convex hull of S.
l(1) =
(
X − α(G1 − C)










l(3) = (X,Y ) ∈ S3 ∩ conv(S1 ∪ S2)
= (1− α)l(1) + αl(2)
where α ∈ (0, 1), and bd(S) denotes the boundary of the
set S. l(3) is an arbitrary point in the congested load set
S3 ∩ conv(S1 ∪ S2), with coordinates (X,Y ). l(3) also lies
on the line segment connecting l(1) and l(2). This suggests
that if l(3) is constant over some time period, it can be met
congestion free using flexibility. In other words suppose we
need to serve a constant load l(3) over some time period T .
Since l(3) cannot be served without congesting the network,
suppose the loads admit flexibility and we dispatch l(1) over
a time period (1− α)T and l(2) over a time period αT . This
results in a congestion free dispatch.
Scenario (1− α)T αT Congestion free
Non-flexible l(3) l(3) No
Flexible l(1) l(2) Yes
To demonstrate the economic effects of a flexible and
congestion free dispatch, we consider each class of market
participants as a collective and calculate the system cost
(SC),5 the generation revenue (GR), the load payment (LP ),
and the merchandising surplus (MS) resulting from each
scenario. The MS is the surplus collected by the system
operator after paying all generators and receiving all payments
from loads, MS = LP − GR. It should be noted that the
MS is zero in the absence of congestion. We denote the non-
flexible scenario (n), and the flexible scenario (f), and we
5This is the value of the objective function solved by the system operator
i.e. the fuel cost of the generators.
Figure 2.19: Polyhedral price regions for the two bus example
can be treated as a function of z. Here z is a vector, the entries of which define the trade ratio
between each location-wise client-server pair. Each agent in such extended system maintains a
belief of the distribution of z. The cost of service as a server will be different in different polyhedral
regions, which can be revealed by different ks.
2.8 Conclusion
We considered the problem of market equilibria that arise in an energy sharing economy where
agents change roles frequently from provider (server) to consumer (client). We developed a model
of bilateral trade under which consumers and providers are matched randomly with each other.
Under the MFG setting, we showed that the MFE consists of a single price bid by both client and
server. We conducted numerical evaluations to study the effects of different equilibrium prices on
trad ratios, and showed in a case study that significant savings are possible in a rooftop PV setting.
We proposed a reasonable extension of the market system accounting for the physical constraints
in the Smart Grid given the geometry of LMPs.
In next chapter, we will discuss the resource management problem from demand side perspec-
tive. Again, we first design a general market mechanism to steer the system toward a desirable
32
equilibrium and conduct performance evaluation via realistic data in the Smart Grid.
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3. MEAN FIELD GAMES IN NUDGE SYSTEMS FOR SOCIETAL NETWORKS∗
3.1 Introduction
There has recently been much interest in understanding societal networks, consisting of in-
terconnected communication, transportation, energy and other networks that are important to the
functioning of human society. These systems usually have a shared resource component, and
where the participants have to periodically take decisions on when and how much to utilize such
resources, but with indirect knowledge of the aggregate utilization of the shared resource. Re-
search into these networks often takes the form of behavioral studies on decision making by the
participants, and whether it is possible to provide incentives to modify their behavior in such a way
that the society as a whole benefits [28, 29].
Our candidate application in this chapter is that of a Load Serving Entity (LSE) or a Load
Aggregator (LA) (e.g., a utility company) trying to reduce its exposure to daily electricity market
volatility by incentivizing demand response in a Smart Grid setting. The reason for our choice is
the ready availability of data and reliable models for the cost and payoff structure that enables a
realistic study. The data used in this chapter was obtained from the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas [30], an organization that manages the wholesale electricity market in the state. The price
shows considerable variation, and peaks at about 5 PM each day, which is when maximum demand
occurs. A major source of this demand in Texas is air conditioning, which in each home is of the
order of 30 kWh per day [31]. Incentivizing customers to move a few kWh of peak-time usage to
the sides of the peak each day could lead to much reduced risks of peak price borne by the LSE.
Such demand shaping could also have a positive effect on environmental impact of power plant
emissions, since supplying peak load is associated with inefficient electricity generation.
As an example, we take the baseline temperature setpoint as 22.5°C, and consider a customer
∗Republished with permission of ACM, from Mean Field Games in Nudge Systems for Societal Networks, Jian Li,
Bainan Xia, Xinbo Geng, Hao Ming, Srinivas Shakkottai, Vijay Subramanian, Le Xie, Transactions on Modeling and
Performance Evaluation of Computing Systems, Volume 3, 2018; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance
Center, Inc.
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that every day increases the setpoint by 1°C in 5 − 6 PM and decreases the setpoint by 0.5°C in
the off-peak times. We will see later that even such a small change of the setpoint of the AC,
the incentives to the users (a group of fifty homes) can be tuned to achieve different trade-offs:
either just a utility increase for the users, just savings to the LSE (of the order of eighty dollars in
our case) or any objective that chooses some appropriate mix of the two. This result is under the
implicit assumption that the LSE in question is a price-taker so that changes in its demand profile
are assumed not to perturb the prices. The shifting of daily energy usage could potentially cause a
small increase in the mean and deviation of the internal home temperature, which is a discomfort
cost borne by the customer. In our approach, the LSE awards a number of “Energy Coupons” to
the customer in proportion to his usage at the non-peak times, and these coupons are used as tickets
for a lottery conducted by the LSE. A higher number of coupons would be obtained by choosing
an option that potentially entails more discomfort, and would also imply a higher probability of
winning at the lottery. Since the customers do not observe the variation of day-ahead prices on a
day-to-day basis nor do they see the aggregate demand at the LSE, the lottery scheme serves as
a light-weight and easy to implement mechanism to transfer some of this information over to the
customers by coupling them. We will explicitly demonstrate the advantage of this coupling over an
individual incentive scheme (a fixed reward for peak time reductions) that serves as a benchmark
for the comparison.
In our analytical model, each agent has a set of actions that it can take in each play of a repeated
game, with each action having a corresponding cost. Higher cost actions yield a higher number
of coupons. Agents participate in a lottery in which they are randomly permuted into groups, and
one or more prizes are given in each group. The state of each agent is measured using his surplus,
which captures the history of plays experienced by the agent, and is a proxy to capture his interest
in participating in the incentive system. A win at the lottery increases the surplus, and a loss
decreases it. Furthermore, we assume that the agent has a prospect incremental utility function
that is increasing and concave for positive surplus and convex for negative surplus. This prospect
theory model captures decision making under risk and uncertainty for agents. Any agent could
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depart from the system with a fixed probability independent of the others, and a departing agent is
replaced by a new entrant with a randomly drawn surplus. The main question we answer in this
chapter then is how would agents decide on what action to take at each play? Having answered this
we also comment on impact of this on the sum total value of the agents, the return to the system
and the trade-off between these two quantities provided by our proposed scheme.
3.1.1 Prospect Theory
Most previous studies account for uncertainty in agent payoffs by means of expected utility the-
ory (EUT). Here, the objective of the decision maker is to maximize the probabilistically weighted
average utilities under different outcomes, and it is assumed that he/she is capable of making ar-
bitrarily complex deductions. However, EUT does not incorporate observed behavior of human
agents, who exhibit bounded rationality and can take decisions deviating from the conventional
rational agent norm. For example, empirical studies have shown that agents ascribe high weights
to rare, positive events (such as winning a lottery) [32].
Prospect theory (PT) [32–35] is perhaps the most well-known alternative theory to EUT. It
was originally developed for binary lotteries [32] and later refined to deal with issues related to
multiple outcomes and valuations [33]. This Nobel-prize-in-economics-winning theory has been
observed to provide a more accurate description of decision making under risk and uncertainty
than EUT. There are three key characteristics of PT. First, the value function is concave for gains,
convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. This feature is due to the observation that
most (human) decision makers prefer avoiding losses to achieving gains. Thus, the value function
is usually S-shaped. Second, a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale is in effect, i.e.,
(human) decision makers will overweight low probability events and underweight high probability
events. The weighting function usually has an inverted S-shape, i.e., it is steepest near endpoints
and shallower in the middle of the range, which captures the behaviors related to risk seeking and
risk aversion. Finally the third, the framing effect is accounted for, i.e., the (human) decision maker
takes into account the relative gains or losses with respect to a reference point rather than the final
asset position. As PT fits better in reality than EUT based on many empirical studies, it has been
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widely used in many contexts such as social sciences [36, 37], communication networks [38–40]
and smart grids [41, 42]. Since we study equilibria that arise through (human) agents’ repeated
play in lotteries, we use PT as opposed to EUT to account for agent-perceived value while taking
decisions.
3.1.2 Mean Field Games
The problem described is an example of a dynamic Bayesian game with incomplete informa-
tion, wherein each player has to estimate the actions of all his potential opponents in the current
lottery (and in the future) without knowing their surpluses, play a best response, and update his
beliefs about their states of surplus based on the outcome of the lottery. However, since the set of
agents is large and, from the perspective of each agent, each lottery is conducted with a randomly
drawn finite set of opponents, an accurate approximation for any agent is to assume that the states
of his opponents (and hence actions) are independent of each other. This is the setting of a Mean
Field Game (MFG) [5, 43, 44], which we will use as a framework to study equilibria in societal
networks. Here, the system is viewed from the perspective of a single agent, who assumes that
each opponent’s action would be drawn independently from an assumed distribution, and plays a
best response action. We say that the system is at a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this best
response action turns out to be a sample drawn from the assumed distribution.
3.1.3 Demand Response in Deregulated Markets
Demand Response is the term used to refer to the idea of customers being incentivized in some
manner to change their normal electricity usage patterns in response to peaks in the wholesale price
of electric power [45]. Many methods of achieving demand response exist, including an extreme
one of turning off power for short intervals to customers a few times a year if the price is very high.
Customers expect a subsidy in return, often in terms of a reduced electricity bill.
3.1.4 Main Results
Our objective in this chapter is to design and analyze a system that can provide greater ability
for the LSE to realize a desired combination of profit and user value by incentivizing user behavior.
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Our main contributions in this chapter are as follows:
(1) We propose a mean field model to capture the dynamics in societal networks. Our model is
well suited to large scale systems in which any given subset of agents interact only rarely. This
kind of system satisfies a chaos hypothesis that enables us to use the mean field approximation to
accurately model agent interactions. The state of the mean field agent is its surplus, and the agent
must choose from a finite set of actions based on its surplus and its belief about the action distribu-
tion of other agents. The state (surplus) evolves according to a Markov process that increases by
winning and decreases by losing at the lottery. Our mean field model of societal networks is quite
general, and can be applied to different incentive schemes that are currently being proposed in the
field of public transportation and communication network usage.
(2) We conduct a simulation analysis of our scheme under an accurate measurement-based model
of the daily usage of electricity in each hour in Texas. We also use the data on wholesale electricity
prices during the interval to calculate what times of day would yield the best returns to rewards.
We show that under several intuitive coupon allocation options and a $15 weekly reward (lottery
prize), customers would change their AC setpoints (as small as 1°C each day) and each week, the
LSE gains a benefit of the order of a $80 over a cluster of 50 homes. While doing so, we also
numerically verify that our model satisfies conditions needed for passage to the mean field.
(3) We conduct comparative studies between a benchmark scheme that returns a fixed reward per
action (assuming that each customer maximizes his return) versus the lottery scheme, and show
that the lottery scheme can outperform the fixed reward scheme by about 100% in terms of total
value to the users, and about 20% in terms of profit to the LSE. We also explore the relation be-
tween LSE profit and user value for both schemes, and show that as one changes the reward values
and coupon allocations, the lottery scheme bounds the achievable region of the benchmark scheme
in a Pareto-sense: it is better able to attain a desired combination of user value and LSE profit, and
includes combinations unachievable by the individual incentive scheme.
(4) We develop a characterization of a lottery in which multiple rewards can be distributed, but
with each participant getting at most one by withdrawing the winner in each round. Each lottery is
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played amongst a cluster of M agents drawn from a random permutation of the set of all agents.
While the exact form of the lottery is not critical to our results, we present it for completeness.
(5) We characterize the best response policy of the mean field agent, using a dynamic program-
ming formulation. We find that under our assumptions, the value function is continuous in the
action distribution, but that multiple actions could turn out to be best responses. Hence, an agent
also needs to choose some randomization method across such equal-value actions. If the value
function is super-modular, sub-modular or S-shaped (under the prospect-based utility function),
the action choices map to surplus intervals, with two actions being of equal value at each interval
boundary.
(6) The probability of winning the lottery defines the transition kernel (along with the regeneration
distribution) of the Markov process of the surplus, and hence maps an assumed distribution across
competitors states to a resultant stationary distribution. We show the existence of a fixed point of
this kernel, which is the MFE, by using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Essentially, the system is
a map between the space consisting of the triple of an assumed action distribution, a randomized
policy and a surplus distribution back to itself, and our result is to show this map has a fixed point.
Our proof of the existence of MFE does not depend on the shape of the utility function, which can
be quite general. Since we have a discrete action and state space, showing a fixed point in the space
of such triples is quite intricate.
A 2-page conference abstract that includes a high-level overview of our results developed here-
in was presented to practitioners in [46].
3.1.5 Related Work
In terms of the MFG, our framework is based on work such as [6, 47, 48]. In [6] the setting
is that of advertisers bidding for spots on a webpage, and the focus is on learning the value of
winning (making a sale though the advertisement) as time proceeds. In [47], apps on smart phones
bid for service from a cellular base station, and the goal is to ensure that the service regime that
results has low per-packet delays. In both works, the existence of an MFE with desired properties
is proved. In [48], the objective is to incentivize truthful revelation of state that would allow for
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optimal resource allocation in a device-to-device wireless network. The state space is discrete, and
the focus is on the exploration of truthful dynamic mechanisms in the mean field regime. However,
unlike that work, we focus on a lottery-based allocation in this chapter. The lottery is simple and
well-established, and has been successfully applied in a variety of existing nudge systems. Thus,
our goal is to analyze this well-established mechanism, rather than designing new ones. Also,
unlike the previous work, all of which focussed on pure strategy equilibria, our current work has a
more complex state space and pure strategy equilibria may not exist due to the non-uniqueness of
best responses. Hence, we seek a mixed strategy equilibrium, which necessitates a different proof
technique.
Nudge systems are typically designed and used to encourage socially beneficial behaviors and
individually beneficial behaviors. For instance, lottery schemes are widely used in practice to
incentivize good behavior, e.g., to combat (sales) tax evasion in Brazil ( [49]), Portugal ( [50]),
Taiwan ( [51]), and for Internet congestion management ( [52]). Similarly, [28, 29] provide exper-
imental results on designing lottery-based “nudge engines” to provide incentives to participants to
modify their behaviors in the context of evenly distributing load on public transportation. In anoth-
er scheme, [53] study the impact of nudging on social welfare by sending one-year home energy
reports to participants and using multiple price lists to determine participants’ willingness to stay
in the system for the next year. Our system is a form of nudge engine, but our focus is on analytical
characterization of system behavior and attained equilibria with large number of customers with
repeated decision-making. We aim to design incentive schemes to modify customer behavior such
that the system as the whole benefits from the attained equilibrium.
Our idea of offering coupons for reduced electricity usage at certain times is based on one
presented in [54], which suggests offering incentives to coincide with predicted realtime price
peaks. An experimental trial based on a similar idea is described in [55], in which the focus is
on designing algorithms to coordinate demand flexibility to enable the full utilization of variable
renewable generation. In [56], this kind of system is modeled as a Stackelberg game with two
stages: setting the coupon values followed by consumer choice. The decision making model in all
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the above research is myopic. The authors of [57] study demand-response as trading off the cost of
an action (such as modifying energy usage) against the probability of winning at a lottery in terms
of a mean field game. However, the game is played in a single step according to their model, and
there is no evolution of state or dynamics based on repeated play. Further, their conception of the
mean field equilibrium is that the mean value of the action distribution (not the distribution itself)
is invariant. Unlike these models, we are interested in characterizing repeated consumer choice
with state evolution when the number of customers is large, and identifying the action distribution
and benefits (if any) of the resulting equilibrium.
A rich literature studies lottery schemes, and here we can only hope to cover a fraction of them
that we see most relevant. In this chapter, we model lotteries as choosing a random permutation of
the M agents participating in it, and picking the first K of them as winners, with the distribution
on the symmetric group of permutations of {1, · · · ,M} being a function of the coupons assigned
to the different actions. Assuming that different actions yield different numbers of coupons, we
will choose the distribution such that more coupons results in a higher probability of winning.
There are various probabilistic models on permutations in the ranking literature [58, 59], Here we
use the popular Plackett-Luce model [60] to implement our lotteries. While the Plackett-Luce
model is used for concreteness, other probabilistic models on permutations such as the Thurstone
model [59] can also be used with the number of coupons as parameters of the distribution as long
as more coupons results in a higher probability of winning.
The monotonicity properties in rewards are shared with other literature, such as [61,62]. In par-
ticular, [62] focuses on the existence of the mean field equilibrium when playersąŕ welfare depends
on the distribution of other players actions. However, this previous work studies the existence of
pure strategy equilibria, whereas our discrete state and action spaces requires consideration of a
mixed strategy equilibrium. The proof of the existence of this equilibrium is one of the major
technical contributions of this chapter.
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3.1.6 Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce our mean field model. We
then conduct simulation-based numerical studies in Section 3.3, on utilizing our framework in the
context of demand response in electricity markets. In Section 3.4 we develop a characterization
of a lottery in which multiple rewards can be distributed, but with each participant getting at most
one by withdrawing the winner in each round. We discuss the basic property of the optimal value
function in Section 3.5. The existence of MFE is considered in Section 3.6. We characterize the
best response policy of the mean field agent, using a dynamic programming formulation in Section
3.7. We conclude in Section 3.8. To ease exposition of our results, all proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
3.2 Mean Field Model
We consider a general model of a societal network in which the number of agents is large.
Agents have a discrete set of actions available to them, and must take one of these actions at each
discrete time instant. The actions result in the agents receiving coupons, with higher cost actions
resulting in more coupons. The agents are then randomly permuted into clusters of size M, and
a nudge is provided via a lottery that is held using the coupons to win real rewards. Thus, agents
must take their actions under some belief about the likely actions, and hence the likely coupons
held by their competitors in the lottery.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the mean field approximation of our model. We provide justification for
the mean field approximation in the discussion at the end of this section. The diagram is drawn
from the perspective of a single agent (w.l.o.g, let this be agent 1), who assumes that the actions
played by each of his opponents would be drawn independently of each other from the probability
mass function ρ. In this section, we will introduce the notation, costs and payoffs of the agent, and
provide a brief description of the policy space and equilibrium.
Time: Time is discrete and indexed by k ∈ {0, 1, · · · }.
Agents: The total number of agents is infinite, and we consider a generic agent 1 who in each
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Figure 3.1: Mean Field Game. Reprinted with permission from [2].
lottery will be paired with M − 1 others drawn randomly.
Actions: We suppose that each agent has the same action space denoted as A = {1, 2, · · · , |A|}.
Hence, the action that this agent takes at time k is a[k] ∈ A. Under the mean field assumption, the
actions of the other agents would be drawn independently from the p.m.f. ρ = [b1, b2, · · · , b|A|],
where ba is the probability mass associated with action a. We call ρ as the assumed action distri-
bution.
Costs: Each action a ∈ A taken at time k has a corresponding cost θa. This cost is fixed and
represents the discomfort suffered by the agent in having to take that action.
Coupons: When agent takes an action a, it is awarded some fixed number of coupons ra for
playing that action. These coupons are then used by the agents as lottery tickets.
Lottery: We suppose that there are only K rewards for agents in one cluster, where K is a fixed
number less than M . The probability of winning is based on the number of coupons that each
agent possesses. We model each lottery as choosing a permutation of the M agents participating
in it, and picking the first K of them as winners. We denote the winning probability as pρ,a and
derive its explicit form in Section 3.4.
States: The agent keeps track of his history of wins and losses in the lotteries by means of his net
surplus at time k, denoted as x[k]. The value of surplus is the state of the agent, and is updated in
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a Markovian fashion as follows:




x[k] + w, if agent 1 wins the lottery,
x[k]− l, if agent 1 loses the lottery,
(3.1)
where w and l is the impact of winning or losing on surplus. Effectively, the assumption is that the
agent expects to win at least an amount l at each lottery. Not receiving this amount would decrease
his surplus. Similarly, if the prize money at the lottery is w + l, the increase in surplus due to
winning is w. Surplus values are discrete, and the set of possible values is given by a countable X
that ranges from (−∞,+∞).
Value function for prospect: The impact of surplus on the agent’s happiness is modeled by an S-
shaped incremental utility function u(x[k]), which is monotone increasing, concave for a positive
surplus and convex for a negative surplus. Moreover, the impact of loss is usually larger than that
of gain of the same absolute value. Note that we implicitly assume that the reference for all agents





u+(x) = xγ, x ≥ 0,
u−(x) = −ϕ(−x)γ, x < 0,
(3.2)
where ϕ > 1 is the loss penalty parameter and 0 < γ < 1 is the risk aversion parameter. A larger
ϕ means that the operator is more loss averse, while a smaller γ indicates that the operator is more
risk seeking. From empirical studies [33, 35], realistic values are ϕ = 2.25 and γ = 0.88.
Weighting function for prospect: It has been observed empirically that people tend to subjec-
tively weight uncertain outcomes in real-life decision making [63]. In the proposed game, this
weighting factors capture the agent’s subjective evaluation on the mixed strategy of its opponents.
Thus, under PT, instead of objectively observing the probability of winning the lottery pρ,a, each
user perceives a weighted version of it, φ(pρ,a). Here, φ(·) is a nonlinear transformation that maps
the objective probability to a subjective one, which is monotonic increasing in probability. It has
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been shown in many PT studies that, people usually overweight low probability outcomes and
underweight high probability outcomes. Following [63], we use the weighting function
φ(p) = exp(−(− ln p)ξ), for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, (3.3)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] is the objective weight that characterizes the distortion between subjective and
objective probability. Note that under the extreme case of ξ = 1, (3.3) reduces to the conventional
EUT probability, i.e., φ(p) = p.
Regeneration: An agent may quit the system at any time, independent of others. This event occurs
with probability 1 − β, where β ∈ (0, 1). When this happens, a new agent takes the place of the
old one, with a state drawn from a probability mass function Ψ.
Best Response Policy: The agent must choose an action at each time, including staying with the
status-quo/baseline as an action too. The green/light tiles in Figure 3.1 relate to the problem of the
agent determining his best response policy. The agent assumes that the actions taken by each of his
M − 1 opponents are drawn independently from probability mass function ρ. Given this assump-
tion, the state of his surplus is x and current utility is u(x), the agent must calculate the probability
of winning at the lottery pρ,a(x), if he were to take action a(x) ∈ A, incurring a cost θa(x) and
gaining ra(x) coupons. Since the agent must take this decision repeatedly, he must solve a dynamic
program to determine his optimal policy. There could be many best response actions, and we as-
sume that the agent chooses a randomized policy σ(x) , [σ1(x), σ2(x), · · · , σa(x), · · · , σ|A|(x)],
in which σa(x) specifies the probability of playing action a when the agent’s surplus is x; in other
words, we enlarge the space to include mixed strategies as pure strategy equilibria may not exist.
The action taken by the agent is a random variable A ∼ σ(x). The details of the lottery and how
to calculate the probability of success are given in Section 3.4. The properties of the best response
policy are described in detail in Section 3.7.
Stationary Surplus Distribution: The assumed action distribution ρ, and the best-response ran-
domized policy σ(x) yield the state transition kernel of the Markov chain corresponding to the
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surplus, via the probability of winning the lottery pρ,a(x). This is illustrated by means of the
blue/dark tiles in Figure 3.1. The transition kernel also is influenced by the regeneration distribu-
tion Ψ. The stationary distribution of surplus associated with the transition kernel is denoted as ζρ.
This stationary distribution of the single mean field agent is equivalent to the one-step empirical
state distribution of infinite agents who all take a (mixed-strategy) action, σ(x) when state is x,
assuming that the actions of their competitors would be drawn from ρ.
Mean Field Equilibrium: The triple of an assumed action distribution ρ, randomized policy σ and
stationary surplus distribution ζ gets mapped via mapping Π∗ into a triple of action distribution
ρ̃, best-response randomized policy σ̃ and a stationary surplus distribution ζ̃ via the operations
described above. A fixed point of the resulting map is called an MFE. For a formal definition and
the proof of existence see Section 3.6.
3.2.1 Discussion
Is the MFG a good approximation? Specifically, we need to first show that for any agent, the
assumption that the states of any finite subset of agents that it interacts with are independent of it
and each other as the number of agents becomes asymptotically large. Second, we need to show
that when we repeat the game over time, the empirical distribution of the agents’ states converges
to a fixed point (mean field limit).
The first result is follows from an argument called propagation of chaos via constructing inter-
action sets defined in [15], which characterize the conditions under which any finite subset of the
state of the agents are independent of each other. Following a similar argument to [6], we can show
that after any finite number of lotteries (finite time), as the total number of agents becomes large
enough, the interaction sets of any finite collections of agents become disjoint with high probabil-
ity. Hence, the states of these agents become independent. Inspired by [6], the proof is divided
into two parts: (i) first, we need to show that as the total number of agents JM (J is the number
of lotteries) becomes large enough, the probability that agent 1 interacted with the set of agents
(that it interacts at the k-th lottery, k ≥ 1) before the k-th lottery become zero; and (ii) the action
distribution ρ1, the randomized policy σ1, and the surplus distribution ζ1 of agent 1 converges to
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the assumed distributions ρ, σ, ζ, respectively, as the number of agents JM becomes large enough.
We do not present the full argument here due to space limitations and the fact that it follows via
identical arguments to [6, 15].
The second result requires the establishment of the so called Mckean-Vlasov limit—a differ-
ential equation that specifies the evolution of the empirical distribution of state over the transition
kernel specified in Figure 3.1. In order to do this, we need to verify three sufficiency conditions
presented in [64]) (see Section 2 Assumptions A1 - A3) built on a continuous-time Markov chain
(CTMC). It is easy to move our discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) setup to their framework by
equipping each agent with an independent Poisson clock with rate λQ (chosen as 1 w.l.o.g). An
agent whose clock ticks is allowed to take an action, and receives a reward with the same prob-
ability engendered by a lottery under the same action and with the same belief distribution. The
equivalence of the stationary distributions of the CTMC and DTMC versions follows immediate-
ly from [65] (Chapter 7), with the Bellman equation of the DTMC system being replaced by the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the CTMC. In our problem, the Q-matrix of the equivalent
CTMC is simply−λQI +λQP, where P is the P-matrix of the DTMC version and I is the identity
matrix. The most important condition of [64] that needs to be verified is the assumption on the
Lipschitz nature of the map between the belief action distribution and the resultant action distribu-
tion. We numerically verify in Section 3.3.6.2 that given an action belief ρ, the derivative of this
map at each iteration step is bounded, leading to the desired Lipschitz property for both DTMC
and CTMC. While this supports the conjecture that the condition holds in our case, the proof is
beyond the scope of this work due to the implicit form of the map.
3.3 Numerical Study
We conduct an empirical data-based simulation in the context of electricity usage for home air
conditioning to illustrate the likely performance of our nudge system in the context of electricity
demand-response. In doing so, we will also numerically study the properties of the mean field
approximation. As mentioned in Section 3.1, our context is that of a Load Serving Entity (LSE)
trying to incentivize its customers to shape their electricity consumption so as to reduce its cost
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of electricity purchase from the wholesale market whose price variation is as shown in Figure 3.2.
These incentives could increase the net surplus of the end-users, the profit of the LSE, or the total
welfare of these agents as well. Data available for our simulations consist of historical electricity
prices from [30], and a data set containing appliance-wise electricity usage for about 1000 homes
along with the ambient temperatures over each day in June–August, 2013 [31].








































n Day−ahead Prices Distribution
Figure 3.2: Day-ahead electricity market prices in dollars per MWh on an hourly basis between 12
AM to 12 PM, measured between June–August, 2013 in Austin, TX. Standard deviations above
and below the mean are indicated separately. Reprinted with permission from [2].
3.3.1 Home Model
A standard continuous time model [66, 67] for describing the evolution of the internal temper-










Pm, if q(t) = 1,
− 1
RC
(τ(t)− τa), if q(t) = 0.
(3.4)
Here, τa is the ambient temperature (of the external environment),R is the thermal resistance of the
home, C is the thermal capacitance of the home, η is the efficiency, and Pm is the rated electrical
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power of the AC unit. The state of the AC is described by the binary signal q(t), where q(t) = 1
means AC is in the ON state at time t and in the OFF state if q(t) = 0. The state is determined by







q(t), |τ(t)− τr| ≤ ∆,
1, τ(t) > τr + ∆,
0, τ(t) < τr −∆,
(3.5)
where τr is the temperature setpoint and ∆ is the temperature deadband.
Table 3.1: Parameters for a Residential AC Unit. Reprinted with permission from [2].
C(Capacitance) R(Resistance) Pm(Power) η(Coefficient) τr(Setpoint) ∆(Deadband)
10 kWh/°C 2 °C/kW 6.8 kW 2.5 22.5 °C 0.3 °C
A number of studies investigate the thermal properties of typical homes. We use the parameters
shown in Table 3.1 for our simulations. These are based on the derivations presented in [66] for
temperature conditioning a 250 m2 home (about 2700 square feet), which is a common mid-size
home in many Texas neighborhoods.
In order to determine the energy usage for AC in our typical home, we need to know how
the ambient temperature varies in Texas during the summer months of interest. These values are
available in the Pecan Street data set, and we plot the values of 3 days which are arbitrarily chosen
over three months for Austin, TX in Figure 3.3.
Next, we calculate the ON-OFF pattern of our typical air conditioner based on the ambient
temperature variation over the course of the day. We do this by simulating the controller in (3.5)
with the appropriate ambient temperature values taken from Figure 3.3. The pattern is presented
in Figure 3.4. We see that there is higher energy usage during the hotter times of the day, as is to












Figure 3.3: Ambient temperature of 3 arbitrary days from June–August, 2013 in Austin, TX.
Measurements are taken every 15 minutes from 12 AM to 12 PM. Reprinted with permission
from [2].
period in Figure 3.2. The total energy used each day corresponding to our 2500 sq ft home with a
5 ton AC (= 6.8 kW; see Table 3.1) is 32.83 kWh. For comparison, we identified 4 homes in the
Pecan Street data set that have parameters in the same ballpark as our typical (simulated) home.
The average size of these real homes was 2627 sq feet, with a 4 ton AC on average, and the average
electricity consumed for airconditioning was 34.8 kWh per day during time interval corresponding
to our simulation. The numbers are quite similar to our simulated home, indicating accuracy of the
model.
3.3.2 Actions, Costs and LSE Savings
Since we are interested in peak-period usage, we consider an action set available to the cus-
tomer that consists of choosing different thermostat setpoints during each hour from 2− 8 PM, i.e,
6 periods (hours) in total. We denote each period by an index j, where j = 1 indicates the period
2−3 PM and so on until j = 6, which indicates the period 7−8 PM. Each action can now be iden-
tified with a vector (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6), where yj indicates the setpoint in the period j. We take
the setpoint 22.5°C as the baseline. Hence, the vector (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) indicates












Figure 3.4: Simulated ON/OFF state of AC over a 24 hour period in a home and the corresponding
interior temperature. The interior temperature falls when the AC comes on, and rises when it is
off. Reprinted with permission from [2].
set of all such setpoint vectors defines an action set A, and we define the action with index a = 0
to be the no-change action. Since the setpoints on a thermostat are discrete, the number of actions
is finite. We identified 5 other actions that appeared to have the most promise of being used. These
actions are shown in the second column of Table 3.2.
We next calculate the cost of taking each action a ∈ A, which corresponds to the discomfort
of having a potentially higher mean and standard deviation in the home temperature, and possibly
higher energy consumption. We measure the state of the home under action a ∈ A by the tuple
consisting of the mean temperature, the standard deviation and energy usage, denoted [τ̄a, σa,Ea].
The baseline state of these parameters is under action 0, denoted by [τ̄0, σ0,E0] We define the cost
of taking any action a as
θa = |τ̄0 − τ̄a|+ λ|σ0 − σa| − ς(E0 − Ea), (3.6)
where we choose λ = 10 to make the numerical values of the mean and standard deviation com-
parable to each other and ς = 10 ¢/kWh as the fixed energy price. We note that the map between
temperature variation, discomfort suffered, and its measurement in cents is not obvious. However,
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given the fact that the customer uses between 1−3 kWh or about ¢10−30 per hour to obtain a tem-
perature differential between the ambient temperature and interior temperature of about 15−20°C,
the discomfort cost of a degree C temperature increase being ¢1 seems reasonable in the limited
temperature range that we are interested in. Note that the calculation of cost for each action in-
volves simulating the home under that action to determine [τ̄a, σa,Ea]. However, this has to be
done only once to create a look-up table, which can be used thereafter. Note also that each action
in A is chosen to be close to energy neutral, i.e., the third term in (3.6) is essentially zero. Thus,
we focus on modifying usage time, not the total usage. Table 3.2 shows our selection of actions
and their corresponding costs.
When applied over a day, each action could result in some savings to the LSE towards the costs
it incurs in purchasing electricity. We measure the day-ahead price of electricity experienced by the
LSE in dollars/MWh and denote the price at time period j in day i as πi,j , where i = {1, 2, · · · , 92}
and j = {1, · · · , 6}. Each action vector of a customer would impose a net price on the LSE in
proportion to the usage. We define the differential price measured in dollars imposed by an action




(k(yi,j)− k(zi,j)) πi,j, (3.7)
where k converts the setpoints into electricity usage in each period, which is measured in MWh.
Setting y as the baseline action (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) presents a way of measuring the
reduction/increase in cost due to the incentive scheme.
We calculated the savings of each action applied over each day of our three month data set
and obtained the average savings. These values are shown in Table 3.2 (where the final columns
entitled “C0–C3” will be discussed in Section 3.3.4). As is clear, the cost of taking each of our
selected actions is considerably lower than the savings resulting from that action, and hence it
might be possible to create appropriate incentive schemes to encourage their adoption. We will
consider two such schemes, namely, (i) a fixed reward scheme used as a benchmark, and (ii) a
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lottery based scheme.
Table 3.2: Actions, Costs, LSE Savings and Coupons Awarded. Reprinted with permission from
[2].
Index Action Vector Cost (¢) LSE C0 C1 C2 C3
Savings (¢)
0 (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) 0 0 37.4 8.416 8.416 8.416
1 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.75, 21.25) 3.68 27.7 715 431.8 521.8 611.8
2 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.25, 22.25) 3.15 22.7 693 431.8 511.6 591.5
3 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23, 22.5) 2.68 22 577 431.8 466.8 501.7
4 (22, 22, 22.25, 23, 23, 22.5) 1.34 19 434 287.4 325.6 363.7
5 (22, 22, 22.25, 23.25, 22.5, 22.75) 0.95 16.4 222 287.4 244.2 200.9
3.3.3 Benchmark Incentive Scheme
A simple incentive scheme to get users to adopt cost saving actions (from the LSE’s perspec-
tive) is to calculate the expected savings of each action, and to deterministically reward each agent
with some percentage of the expected savings for taking that action. Such guaranteed savings are
similar in spirit to rebate for using public transportation during off-peak hours, and a system of
sharing a fraction of the savings by demand-response providers such as OhmConnect [68]. We
will use this scheme as a benchmark in order to determine whether shared savings are large e-
nough to encourage meaningful participation. Thus, our benchmark incentive scheme attempts to
incentivize each action by returning to the user some fixed fraction of the expected LSE savings for
that action presented in Table 3.2. For example, a return of 50% for taking action 1 would imply
awarding ¢13.85 each time that action is taken.
3.3.4 Lottery-Based Incentive Scheme
Our second incentive scheme is lottery-based, with Energy Coupons being used as lottery tick-
ets. Now, the baseline action a = 0 corresponds to a setpoint of 22.5°C in period 3 at which πi,3
is highest (Figure 3.2) for any day i. Hence, the LSE should incentivize actions that are likely
to reduce the risks of peak day-ahead price by offering Energy Coupons in proportion to the us-
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age during the corresponding periods. In the context of our simulation, it is intuitively clear that
coupons must be placed at periods of lower price. Our candidate coupon profiles are shown in
Table 3.3, where coupons are awarded in periods 1 and 6 only if the usage is greater than base
usage values of x1 = 2.464 kWh and x6 = 2.24 kWh, respectively. We experimented with a range
of coupon profiles to explore their impact on the MFE, and present some examples C0–C3.
Table 3.3: Mean Day-ahead Price and Energy Coupon Profiles. Reprinted with permission from
[2].
Index Period Price/MWh C0/kWh C1/kWh C2/kWh C3/kWh
1 2− 3 PM $47 107 100 100 100
2 3− 4 PM $55 5.4 0 0 0
3 4− 5 PM $78 1.8 0 0 0
4 5− 6 PM $99.6 0 0 0 0
5 6− 7 PM $66.5 3.6 0 0 0
6 7− 8 PM $49.5 54 0 20 40
Given the coupon placement by the LSE, the customers need to determine the number of
coupons resulting from each action, and use these values to estimate the utility that they would
attain. Our six actions are shown in Table 3.2 with their attendant costs and number of coupons
received. The LSE conducts an lottery each week across clusters of M = 50 homes participating
in each lottery. For each cluster, there is K = 1 prize for winning the lottery. We assume that the
customers choose the same action on each day of the week, and then participate in the lottery.
3.3.5 Utility and Surplus
As described in Section 3.2, the user state consists of his/her surplus. Any rewards result in
an increase in surplus by the reward amount w, whereas performing an action but not receiving
a reward results in decreasing the surplus by some amount l. Since a reward is assured for each
action in the benchmark incentive scheme, there are no surplus decrease events. However, in the
lottery scheme, a user that does not win the lottery would see a decrease in surplus. We select l
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that results from losing at a lottery to be the average reward obtained form the lottery assuming
that every player has an equal probability of winning.
For the customer utility, which maps surplus to utility units, we use the value function of
prospect model (defined in (3.2)), u(x) = xγ if x ≥ 0 or u(x) = −ϕ(−x)γ if x < 0, where
ϕ = 2.25 and γ = 0.88 according to the empirical studies conducted in [33, 35]. The utility
model applies to both the benchmark and the lottery scheme. Under this model, we expect a user
who has lost a number of lotteries to stop participating in the system, since his surplus becomes
negative and he is not receiving enough of an incentive to stay, given the cost he bears each day.
Similarly, a user who has won too many times would have a large surplus, and would also not be
keen on participating since the marginal utility he gets may not be high enough for him. The latter
observation applies to the benchmark as well, although given the small rewards, we do not expect
it to happen frequently.
The participants in the lottery scheme see a distorted probability of winning, parameterized by
ξ, as defined in (3.3). This is an important feature of our model, since it captures the attractiveness
of lotteries in incentivizing risky actions. Consistent with empirical studies in [63], we choose
ξ = 0.37.
We assume that a customer remains in the system with probability 0.92, i.e., the average life-
time is 12 time steps, which parallels the fact that the main summer season lasts for about three
months. Further, a newly entering customer has zero surplus.
3.3.6 Equilibria Attained by Incentive Schemes
3.3.6.1 Benchmark Scheme
As described in Section 3.3.3, we construct a fixed-reward type of incentive scheme to obtain
a benchmark with which to compare the performance of the lottery scheme. Under the bench-
mark scheme, customers are awarded some percentage of the expected savings that their action is
likely to yield to the LSE, shown in Table 3.2. The actual action chosen by the customer will be
determined using a dynamic program (DP) similar to the one defined in (3.14). However, since
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rewards are deterministic, there is no dependence on the belief over competitors’ actions, and the
only randomness is from the lifetime of the user. Thus, solving the DP is straightforward, and we
can easily obtain a map between surplus and action for a given reward.
3.3.6.2 Lottery Scheme
We next consider the lottery with M = 50 competitors. The win probability pρ,a is the proba-
bility that the coupons generated by action a are greater than those generated byM−1 independent
actions drawn from ρ. We offer a single prize with value $15, which implies that the customer ex-
pects to win ¢30 on average by participating, i.e., the decrease in surplus due to losing at the lottery
is l = 0.3, while the increase in surplus due to winning is w = 15− 0.3 = 14.7.
We start with a uniform action distribution ρ0 as the initial condition. In each iteration i, given
the belief ρi (action distribution of other players), we first determine the value of each state using
the Bellman equation for value (3.15), with convergence in roughly 50 steps. We next determine
the stationary surplus distribution, and then map it to the resultant stationary action distribution
ρi+1, uniformly choosing all equal value actions. Note that this map Π̃, from belief ρi to the
resultant distribution ρi+1, is a sequential version of the map Π∗ from Section 3.2, and Π̃ and
Π∗ have the same fixed points. As described in Section 3.2.1, the iterative procedure is referred
to as the Mckean-Vlasov dynamics. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, we also identify the CTMC
version of our system, and simulate it using the same procedure above. Finally, as specified in
Section 3.2.1, an important sufficiency condition for convergence is the Lipschitzness of the map




Figure 3.5 (Left) plots the derivative along a simulated trajectory for both DTMC and CTMC. That
they are bounded, indicates the Lipschitz property of the maps.
We found that typically convergence occurs rapidly and reaches within 0.1% of the final value
within 20 iterations. The eventual values to which each surplus value converge is the mean field
56
surplus distribution, in which it turns out that customers win at a lottery at most once over an
average lifetime of 12 time intervals, as is to be expected with a cluster size of 50 customers at
each lottery. The mean field action distribution under the lottery scheme with a $15 reward and
the savings attained are shown in Table 3.4. The MFE shifts based on the coupon profile, but the
saving is quite robust to profiles that award comparable numbers of coupons in periods 1 and 6.
We observed multiple thresholds at which two actions have identical value. For example, under
coupon profile C0, there are three threshold surplus values −19.2, 1.7 and 190.3 at which we have
equal probabilities of choosing between actions 0 and 2, between 2 and 4, and between 4 and 5,
respectively.
Table 3.4: Mean Field Equilibria under $15 reward (lottery prize). Reprinted with permission
from [2].
Coupon Profile MFE Expected Surplus Expected Value LSE Saving
C0 [0.001, 0, 0.81, 0, 0.19, 0] 0.3563 $189.8 $77
C1 [0.001, 0, 0, 0.584, 0, 0.416] 0.3704 $203.5 $69
C2 [0.001, 0, 0.875, 0.124, 0, 0] 0.3565 $193.1 $79
C3 [0.001, 0, 0.999, 0, 0, 0] 0.3563 $189.4 $79.4
Example
Figure 3.5 (Middle) shows the interior temperature under actions 0, 2, 4, the mean field action
distribution and benchmark action when $15 is the total reward amount. We see that the mean field
behavior is more aggressive than the benchmark in reducing the interior temperature before the
peak period, and shows a marginally higher interior temperature during the peak period. Figure 3.5
(Right) shows the comparison of energy consumption between action 0 (doing nothing, with an
average energy consumption of 36.5 kWh per day), the mean field action distribution (average
energy consumption of 36.7 kWh per day), and the benchmark action (average energy consumption
of 36.4 kWh per day). We see that the mean field distribution is more aggressive in moving energy
usage away from the peak period as compared to the benchmark, although both have essentially
the same energy consumption and an identical reward value of $15 per week. Finally, we compute
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that the savings to the LSE over 50 homes each week in this is example is $57.4 in the benchmark
scheme and $77 in the lottery scheme. Thus, incentivizing customers by offering a prize of $15
each week is certainly feasible. The MFE illustrates that even as small as 1°C change of the
setpoint of AC each day over several homes can yield significant benefits.


























Figure 3.5: (Left) Numerical derivative of map; (Middle) Simulated ON/OFF state of AC over a 24
hour period under actions 0, 2, 4, the mean field action and the benchmark action on an arbitrary
day and the corresponding interior temperature. The temperature graph is slightly offset for actions
2, 4, the mean field action and the benchmark action for ease of visualization; (Right) Average daily
energy usage profile. Reprinted with permission from [2].
3.3.7 Performance Analysis of Incentive Schemes
Benchmark Scheme
We consider a range of scenarios wherein the LSE rewards customers for each action with
between 1%− 100% of its expected savings, in steps of 1% increments. The relations between the
total weekly reward to customers, savings to the LSE and profit to the LSE, are shown in Figure 3.6
(Left). We see that the maximum weekly profit of $52 is achieved when about 9% savings (about
$10 in total per week) is the customer reward regardless of the coupon awarding profile, indicating
robustness to the exact profile employed. Note that although the reward under the benchmark
scheme is indicated by a percentage returned, it corresponds to a dollar value returned based on the
actions of the customers, and the total dollar reward values are also shown in green (dashed line)
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Figure 3.6: The relation between offered reward, LSE savings and LSE profit: (Left) Benchmark
incentive scheme and (Middle) Lottery scheme; (Right) The relation between profit to the LSE
and the expected value of a generic customer when different rewards are given to the customers.
Reprinted with permission from [2].
Lottery Scheme
We next conduct numerical experiments under a range coupon profiles and lottery rewards from
$5 to $95 in steps of $5 increments as we did (by using percentage returns) with the benchmark
scheme. Hence, we set a reward value, calculate the values of l and w that it implies, and compute
the MFE for different coupon awarding profiles. Our results are shown in Figure 3.6 (Middle),
where we plot the total savings to the LSE as well as its profit (savings minus reward) as a function
of the reward offered for winning the lottery. From Figure 3.6 (Middle), the maximum profit is
achieved by in a robust manner giving a reward of $15 − $20 for all coupon profiles Also, from
observation of the mean field action distribution that results from this reward (Table 3.4), we note
that almost all the customers will participate in the system, i.e., the probability of choosing action
0 is close 0.
From Figures 3.6 (Left) and 3.6 (Middle), we see that the maximum profit using the lottery
scheme is a little over $62 per week, while the maximum profit is only about $52 under the bench-
mark scheme. Given that a typical LSE has several hundred thousand customers, a difference of
$10 each week over a cluster of 50 homes is quite significant.
Comparison of Local Social Welfare
Our final step is to characterize the local social welfare under the lottery (under different coupon
profiles) and the benchmark. We define the (expected) local social welfare (LSW) measured in
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dollars/week as
LSW = 50EMFE[Vi(X)] + profits of the LSE. (3.9)
For the lottery scheme, the maximum expected value to each user of roughly 600 each is ob-
tained when the LSE is revenue neutral. This is roughly 100% better than what can be achieved
with the benchmark individual incentive. This increase is due to both the prospect-based utility as
well as coupling across users in the lottery scheme.
Note also that the LSE obtains a maximum profit between $62 − $64.4 (for different coupon
profiles) by giving a $15 reward, under which each customer will take actions according to the
MFEs shown in Table 3.4. The corresponding surplus is also shown, which for a generic customer
is between $189.2− $203.5. Therefore, the local social welfare is about $9552.
For the benchmark, the profit to the LSE is $42 when $15 reward is given as shown in Figure 3.6
(Left), under which each customer will only take action 5. The corresponding expected value of
a generic customer is about $56.2, and the local social welfare is about $2852. Again, we see that
the lottery scheme outperforms the benchmark.
We perform the same analysis to determine the relation between profit to the LSE and the
expected value of a generic customer under different rewards and coupon profiles. Our results
are shown in Figure 3.6 (Right). We explore a range of rewards from $5 to the break-even point
($80 for lottery scheme and $95 for the benchmark, regardless of the coupons awarded). The
points on each curve correspond to increasing the reward by $5 in steps in a manner indicated
by the arrow marks. From Figure 3.6 (Right), we see that the lottery scheme appears to better
capture the frontier between LSE profit and customer value than the benchmark scheme, with the
lottery-based incentive being better in a Pareto-sense. This is true regardless of the exact maximum
coupon choice. Thus, based on a desired level of customer value and LSE profit, the lottery scheme
can ensure a better outcome than the benchmark scheme with an appropriate reward.
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3.4 Lottery Scheme
We first construct the lottery scheme that will be used in our mean field game. We permute all
the agents into clusters, such that there are exactly M agents in each cluster, and conduct a lottery
in each such cluster. Suppose there are K rewards for all agents in one cluster, where K is a fixed
number less than M . When an agent takes an action, he/she will receive the credit (number of
coupons) associated with that action. Then the probability of winning is based on the number of
coupons that each agent possesses. We will model the lotteries as choosing a permutation of theM
agents participating in it, and picking the firstK of them as winners. Then different lottery schemes
can be interpreted as choosing different distributions on the symmetric group of permutations on
M . In particular, we will use ideas from the Plackett-Luce model to implement our lotteries.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the actions are ordered in decreasing order of the
costs so that θ1 ≥ · · · ≥ θA. In order to incentivize agents to take the more costly actions we will
insist that the vector of coupons obtained for each action is also in decreasing order of the index,
i.e., r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rA.
The specific lottery procedure we consider is the following: for every agent m that takes action
a[m] and receives coupons ra[m] > 0, we choose an exponential random variable with mean 1/ra[m]
and then pick the first K agents in increasing order of the realizations of the exponentials. Note
the abuse of notation only in this section to use a[m] to refer to the action of agent m. Since we
consider only one lottery, we do not consider time k. Let the agent m = 1, . . . ,M receive ra[m]
number of coupons. The set of winners is a permutation over the agent indices, and we denote
such a permutation by µ = [µ1, µ2, · · · , µM ]. We then have the probability of the permutation µ
given by






Essentially, after each agent is chosen as a winner, he is removed and the next lottery is conducted
just as before but with fewer agents.
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We now analyze the probability of winning in our lottery. For analysis under the mean field
assumption, it suffices to consider agent 1 with the coupons it gets by taking action a being denoted
as ra[1]. LetM := {2, . . . ,M}, which is the set of opponents of agent 1. For these agents, suppose
there are υn agents that choose action n, where
∑
n∈A υn = M − 1. We denote the vector of these
actions by ~υ = (υ1, . . . , υA).













where L refers to the fact that agent 1 “loses,”M1 = M, and for l ≥ 2 we haveMl = Ml−1 \
{κl−1}. Essentially, the above looks at the lottery process round by round, and is a summation of
the probabilities of all permutations in which agent 1 does not appear in the first spot in any round.
The above expression considerably simplifies if the summations are instead taken over the
actions κ̃l that the lottery winner κl at round l ∈ {1, . . . , K} can take. Note that we assume that we
can distinguish the actions based on the number of coupons given out. If this were not true, then we
could further simplify the expression by summing over the coupon space. Given a coupon/action
profile ~υ, let J (~υ) denote the actions that have non-zero entries. Additionally, by ~υ − ~1κ̃ for
κ̃ ∈ J (~υ) denote the resulting coupon profile obtained by removing one entry at location κ̃, and
by r~υ the sum of all the coupons in profile ~υ, i.e.,
∑














where ~υ1 = ~υ, for l = 2, . . . , K, ~υl = ~υl−1 − ~1κ̃l and υlκ̃ is the number of entries at location κ̃ for
coupon profile ~υl. Note that pL1,~υ is a decreasing function of ra[1] for every ~υ. Therefore, agent 1
comparing two actions i and j that have r1,i > r1,j will find pL1,~υ(i) < p
L
1,~υ(j) for all ~υ. Also by
taking the limit of ra[1] going to 0, having an action with 0 coupons results in a loss probability of
1 for every ~υ.
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To determine the probability of winning in the lottery we need to account for the fact that
the actions of the opponents are drawn from the distribution ρ (under the mean field assumption).
Hence, the probability of obtaining the coupon profile (equivalently action profile) of the opponents
~υ = (υ1, . . . , υA) is given by the multinomial formula, i.e.,
Pρ(~υ) =
(M − 1)!∏i∈A bυii∏
i∈A υi!
. (3.12)
Using (3.11) and (3.12), we obtain the winning probability for the mean field agent 1 when





By lower bounding each term in the conditional probability of not obtaining a reward we get
pρ,a ≤ 1 − M−KM ( rAr1 )
K =: pW ∈ (0, 1). If we ran the lottery without removing the winners
(and any of their coupons), we obtain a lower bound on the probability of winning that has a





∈ (0, 1). Note that both bounds are independent of ρ. If we allow an action
that yields 0 coupons, then the above bounds become trivial with pW = 1 and pW = 0.
An important feature of our lottery scheme is that the probability of winning increases with the
number of coupons given out. For simplicity we assumed a fixed reward for any win. However, we
can extend the lotteries to ones where different rewards are given out at different stages, and also
where the rewards are dependent on the number of coupons of the winner. For the latter, we will
insist on the rewards being an increasing function of the number of coupons of the winner. Finally,
we can also extend to scenarios where we choose the number of stagesK in an (exogenous) random
fashion in {1, . . . ,M−1}. Since the analysis carries through unchanged except with more onerous
notation, we only discuss the simplest setting.
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3.5 Optimal Value Function
As discussed in Section 3.2, the mean field agent must determine the optimal action to take,
given his surplus x and the assumed action distribution ρ. We follow the usual quasi-linear combi-
nation of prospect function and cost consistent with Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions,
and under which the impact of winning or losing in the lottery is on the surplus of the agent (and
not simply a one-step myopic value change).














where x[k] = (x1[k], · · · , xM [k]), and a(x[k]) = (a1(x1[k]), · · · , aM(xM [k])) are the vectors of
surplus and actions for each agent in the particular lottery cluster of the agent at time k, respective-
ly. The expectation is over the distribution of competitors actions and the randomness introduced
by the lottery.
Under the mean field assumption, the actions of all agents besides i are drawn from a distri-
bution ρ independently of each other. Also, the agent uses a prospect function to estimate the
probabilities of winning and losing at the lottery. We can then drop the index of the agent i and




{u(x)− θa(x) + β[φ(pρ,a(x))Vρ(x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x))Vρ(x− l)]}. (3.14)
Note that pρ,a(x) is a result of a lottery that we described in detail in Section 3.4, and φ(·) is
the weighting function, which overweights small probabilities (of winning the lottery) and un-
derweights moderate and high probabilities (of losing the lottery). Here, we use the weighting
function defined in (3.3).
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First, we need to define a set of functions as
Φ =
{








where Ω(x) = max{|u(x)|, 1}. Note that Φ is a Banach space with Ω−norm,






Also define the Bellman operator Tρ as
Tρf(x) = max
a(x)∈A
{u(x)− θa(x) + β[φ(pρ,a(x))f(x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x))f(x− l)]}, (3.15)
where f ∈ Φ.
We now show that the optimal value function Vρ(x) exists and it is continuous in ρ.
Lemma 9. 1) There exists a unique f ∗ ∈ Φ, such that Tρf ∗(x) = f ∗(x) for every x ∈ X, and
given x ∈ X, for every f ∈ Φ, we have T nρ f(x)→ f ∗(x), as n→∞.
2) The fixed point f ∗ of operator Tρ is the unique solution of Equation (3.14), i.e. f ∗ = V ∗ρ .
Lemma 10. The value function Vρ(·) is Lipschitz continuous in ρ.
3.5.1 Stationary distributions
For a generic agent, w.l.o.g., say agent 1, we consider the state process {x1[k]}∞k=0. It’s a
Markov chain with countable state-space X, and it has an invariant transition kernel given by a
combination of the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus x for any a(x) ∈ A, and the lottery
scheme from Section 3.4. By following this Markov policy, we get a process {W [k]}∞k=0 that takes
values in {win, lose} with probability pρ,a(x) for the win, drawn conditionally independent of the
past (given x1[k]). Then the transition kernel conditioned on W [k] is given by
P(x1[k] ∈ B|x1[k − 1] = x,W [k]) = β1{x+w1{W [k]=win}−l1{W [k]=lose}∈B} + (1− β)Ψ(B), (3.16)
65
where B ⊂ X and Ψ is the probability measure of the regeneration process for surplus. The
unconditioned transition kernel is then











1x−l∈B + (1− β)Ψ(B).
Lemma 11. The Markov chain where the action policy is determined by σ(x) based on the states of
the users and the transition probabilities in (3.17) is positive recurrent and has a unique stationary
surplus distribution. We denote the unique stationary surplus distribution as ζρ×σ. Let ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x)
be the surplus distribution at time k induced by the transition kernel (3.17) conditioned on the



















Thus ζρ×σ(B) in terms of ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x) is simply based on the properties of the conditional ex-






, the random variable X is the initial condition of the
surplus, distributed as Ψ. For x ∈ X, the only possible one-step updates are the increase of the
surplus to x+ w or a decrease to x− l, i.e. B = {x+ w, x− l}.
3.6 Mean Field Equilibrium
The action distribution ρ is a probability mass function on the action set A: let bi be the proba-
bility of choosing action i. Note that ρ lives in the probability simplex on R|A|, which is compact
and convex; denote it as Γρ. Let ζ be the stationary surplus distribution and the set of all such
possible surplus distributions is denoted as Γζ , which is a compact and convex subset of l∞: all
surplus distributions are dominated by the distribution obtained by allowing the agent to win in
every period; all surplus distributions dominate the distribution obtained by allowing the agent to
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lose in every period; both these distributions have a finite mean (and convexity follows); and then
the compactness result follows using the argument in [69]. For a given surplus x, let σ(x) be the
action distribution at x. Denote Γσ as the set of all possible distributions over the action space for
each x, which is compact and convex. We further assume that ρ ∈ Γρ, ζ ∈ Γζ and σ(x) ∈ Γσ for
each x ∈ X.
Definition 1. Consider the action distribution ρ, the randomized policy σ and the stationary sur-
plus distribution ζρ: (i) Given the action distribution ρ, determine the success probabilities in the
lottery scheme using (3.13) and then compute the value function in (3.14). Taking the best response
given by (3.14) results in an action distribution σ̃; (ii) Given action distribution ρ, following the
randomized policy σ yields transition kernels for the surplus Markov chain and stationary surplus
distribution ζ̃ρ, (with each transition kernel having a unique stationary distribution); and (iii) Giv-
en the stationary surplus distribution ζρ, applying the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus x
yields the distribution of actions ρ̃. Define the best response mapping Π∗ that maps Γρ⊗ Γ|X|σ ⊗ Γζ
into itself. Then we say that the assumed action distribution ρ, randomized policy σ and stationary
surplus distribution ζρ constitute a mean field equilibrium (MFE) if Π∗ : ρ⊗ σ ⊗ ζρ 7→ ρ̃⊗ σ̃ ⊗ ζ̃ρ
has (ρ, σ, ζρ) as a fixed point.
3.6.1 Existence of MFE
Theorem 6. There exists an MFE of ρ, the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus x and ζ , such
that ρ ∈ Γρ, σ(x) ∈ Γσ and ζ ∈ Γζ , ∀a ∈ A and ∀x ∈ X.
We will be specializing to the spaces Γρ,Γσ,Γζ and define the topologies being used in the
following proofs first.
1. For the assumed action distribution ρ ∈ Γρ on the finite set A, all norms are equivalent,
we will consider the topology of uniform convergence, i.e., using the l∞ norm given by
||ρ|| = maxa∈A ρ(a).
2. For the randomized policy σ ∈ Γ|X|σ , we enumerate the elements in X as 1, 2, · · · , and
consider the metric topology generated by norm ||σ|| = ∑∞j=1 2−j|σ(xj)|, where |σ(x)| =
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maxa∈A σ(x, a). We consider the convergence of any sequence {σn}∞n=1 to σ in this topolog-
ical space.
3. For the surplus distribution ζ on the countable set X, we consider the topology of point-
wise convergence, which can be shown to be equivalent to convergence in l∞, i.e., uniform
convergence, using coupling results presented in [69].
Note that from the definition of Γρ, Γσ and Γζ , they are already non-empty, convex and com-
pact. Furthermore, they are jointly convex. Then in order to show that the mapping Π∗ satisfies the
conditions of Kakutani fixed point theorem, we only need to verify the following three lemmas.
Lemma 12. Given ρ, by taking the best response given by (3.14), we can obtain the action distri-
bution σ(x) for every x, which is upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Remark 1. As we have discussed earlier, since our state space and action space are discrete, there
might exist multiple best response actions when the agent solves the dynamic program. Thus, a pure
equilibrium might not exist. Since the best response can be set-valued, we need to consider mixed
strategies. In other words, the agent needs to choose a randomized action policy for each state.
Hence, the randomized policy σ is critical in the construction of the MFE given in Definition 1.
Lemma 13. Given ρ and σ(x), there exists a unique stationary surplus distribution ζ(x), which is
continuous in ρ and σ(x).
Lemma 14. Given ζ(x) and σ(x), there exists a stationary action distribution ρ, which is contin-
uous in ζ(x) and σ(x).
3.7 Characteristics of the Best Response Policy
In this section, we characterize the best response policy under the assumption that Vρ in (3.14)
has some properties. Then we discuss the relations between the incremental utility function u(x)
and the optimal value function Vρ.
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3.7.1 Existence of Threshold Policy
We make the assumption that given the action distribution ρ, Vρ(x) is increasing and submod-
ular in x when x ≤ −l; increasing and linear in x when −l ≤ x ≤ w; and increasing and
supermodular in x, when x ≥ w.
In Section 3.4, our lotteries are constructed such that the probability of winning monotonically
increases with the cost of the action. This when combined with the monotonicity, submodularity
(decreasing differences) for positive argument and supermodularlity (increasing differences) for
negative argument of Vρ yields the following characterization of the best response policy.
Lemma 15. For any two action, say actions a1 and a2, suppose that θa1 > θa2 , so that pρ,a1 > pρ,a2 ,
i.e., φ(pρ,a1) > φ(pρ,a2), then there is a threshold value of the surplus queue for user such that
preference order for the actions changes from one side of the threshold to the other.
Using the same argument as Lemma 15, under the assumption that Vρ(x) is increasing and
submodular in x ∈ (−∞,∞), or increasing and supermodular in x ∈ (−∞,∞), we can show the
existence of a threshold policy.
3.7.2 Relations between incremental utility function u(x) and the optimal value function Vρ
3.7.2.1 Concave/Convex incremental utility function
Lemma 16. Given the action distribution ρ, Vρ(x) is an increasing and submodular (i.e., decreas-
ing differences) function of x if u(x) is a concave and monotone increasing function of x, super-
modular (i.e., increasing differences) function of x if u(x) is a convex and monotone increasing
function of x.
Thus, from Lemma 16 and Lemma 15, the optimal policy takes a threshold form for both
concave and convex incremental utility function.
3.7.2.2 Conjecture for S-shaped prospect incremental utility function
We found numerically that with an S-shaped utility function, the value function satisfies the
super/sub-modularity conditions on the positive/negative axis respectively. If this holds true in
69
general, then from Lemma 15, the optimal policy would take a threshold form, and indeed this is
what we observed numerically. However, we are not able to prove this result due to the implicit
nature of the value function, and we can only conjecture that this condition might hold for some
class of S-shaped utility functions.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we developed a general framework for analyzing incentive schemes, referred to
as nudge systems, to promote desirable behavior in societal networks by posing the problem in the
form of a Mean Field Game (MFG). Our incentive scheme took the form of awarding coupons in
such that higher cost actions would correspond to more coupons, and conducting a lottery period-
ically using these coupons as lottery tickets. Using this framework, we developed results in the
characteristics of the optimal policy and showed the existence of the MFE.
We used the candidate setting of an LSE trying to promote demand-response in the form of set-
ting high setpoints in higher price time of the day in order to transfer energy usage from a higher
to a lower price time of day for an air conditioning application. We conducted data driven simula-
tions that accurately account for electricity prices, ambient temperature and home air conditioning
usage. We showed how the prospect of winning at a lottery could potentially motivate customers
to change their AC usage patterns sufficiently that the LSE can more than recoup the reward cost
through a likely reduced expenditure in electricity purchase. Further, we showed that a lottery
is more effective than a fixed reward at enabling such desirable behavior and can attain a better
tradeoff between social value and LSE profits.
Given the desirable analysis so far, we implemented a real system called EnergyCoupon and
conduct experiment among customers in practice. We will present the experiment results and
analysis in the following chapter.
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4. INCENTIVE-BASED DEMAND RESPONSE: EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT AND
CRITICAL APPRAISAL∗
4.1 Introduction
With the increasing penetration of renewable energy resources such as wind and solar, there is a
growing interest on the demand-side management, or demand response (DR). DR has the potential
to become a flexible resource to increase the reliability and efficiency to the power system. Refer-
ence [70] defines the demand response as the changes of end-consumers’ electricity consumption
in peak hours from their normal patterns. Many independent system operators in the U.S. such as
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), New York ISO (NYISO), California ISO (CAISO)
and ISO New England have operated day-ahead and real-time DR programs by means of providing
energy, reserve and auxiliary services [71–73].
Demand response in the U.S originated in the 1970s, mainly due to the popularity of usage of
central air conditioners [74]; Since then, a huge amount of DR programs are designed and imple-
mented. This chapter categorizes the DR programs in two dimensions: 1) Direct load control or
self-controlled (market-based) programs; and 2) the scale of target end-consumers (large industri-
al/commercial or small residential customers). Direct load control enables the DR operator (such
as the utility) to remotely turn off or change the setpoint of the customers’ equipments; in such
a way, the amount of load shedding can be easily controlled within specified intervals, but it also
causes problems in customers comfort and satisfaction (imaging your air conditioner is forced to
turn off in hot summer/cold winter). Market-based DR programs tend to use prize signals or other
incentives to encourage customers’ self-motivated load control behaviors. Such programs usually
have less ruin on the customers’ comfort and satisfaction, but less precise when a specified amount
of reduction needs to be achieved.
∗Part of the results reported in this chapter is reprinted with permission of ACM, from EnergyCoupon: A Case
Study on Incentive-based Demand Response in Smart Grid, Bainan Xia, Hao Ming, Ki-Yeob Lee, Yuanyuan Li,
Yuqi Zhou, Shantanu Bansal, Srinivas Shakkottai, Le Xie, e-Energy, 2017; permission conveyed through Copyright
Clearance Center, Inc.
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In terms of customer scale, industrial or commercial customers are usually large profit-seeking
entities; therefore they have advantages over small residential customers. Energy management
systems are developed to help increasing the energy efficiency in data centers, retails, telecoms etc
and coordinate with market based signals (such as real-time electricity and gas prices) [75]. On
the other hand, residential customers pay more attention on personal habit and comfort; therefore,
some price-based mechanisms (such as time-of-usage (TOU), critical peak pricing (CPP) [76] and
market-index retail plans offered by the utility) do not have significant impact to the majority of
residential end-consumers with fixed-rate retail plans. Given the fact that residential takes the most
electricity consumption in the U.S (38%, compared with commercial 37% and industry 25%) [75],
the potential of DR in residential is far from fully explored. Table 4.1 summarized some current
researches and implementations in different categories of demand response.




























Despite the research [76,82] and commercial programs (ENERNOC [83], Ohmconnect [84]) of
price-based DR, an alternative market-based solution to residential DR programs named coupon-
incentive based demand response (CIDR) aims at providing coupon incentives to reduce the elec-
tricity consumption of residential end-consumers during peak hours [85–87]. Compared with the
above traditional DR programs, this mechanism has the following advantages: purely voluntary,
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penalty-free to customers, and can be implemented to the majority of residential end-consumers
who face fixed retail plans. A program named EnergyCoupon is the first-of-its-kind implemen-
tation of CIDR, with additional inherited innovations: 1) it provides dynamic DR events to end-
consumers with individualized targets; 2) periodic lotteries are designed to convert coupons earned
in DR events into dollar-value prizes. A small-scale pilot project was conducted in 2016, and we
found clear load profile change of the residential customers [3].
In terms of 2) periodic lotteries, a lot of researches and commercial programs shows how the
“nudge engine”, games and lotteries help to encourage the desired behaviors of human beings.
Reference [88] tries to discover the social value of energy saving, [87] models the CIDR system as
a two-stage Stackelberg game, and [89–91] use the “mean field games” to describe end-consumers’
behaviors in the DR program with lottery-based incentives. On the other hand, the lottery scheme
has already been implemented on encouraging the uniform load on public transportation [92] and
relieving congested roadways [93]; however, there are few practical works, including some ongo-
ing experiments [94, 95], trying to adopt the lottery scheme on DR programs.
Built upon our previous studies, a larger-scale experiment, which is closer to the real world,
was carried out in 2017 with much more comprehensive designs and critical assessments1. The
improvements in experiment (’17) include but not limited to: 1) an extra comparison group for data
analysis and comparison; 2) an improved baseline algorithm (“similar day”); 3) the treatment group
divided into two subgroups facing fixed and dynamic DR events. More facts and comparisons
between two experiments are listed in Table 4.2. We will show in later sections that these changes
help to analyze end-consumers’ behaviors in-depth.
The main contributions EnergyCoupon are as follows:
1. Providing price and baseline prediction algorithms suitable for DR programs;
2. Systematically documenting the experiment design, collection, and posterior analysis of on
residential customers;
1Unless otherwise specified, in the remaining part of this chapter, “experiment (’16)” refers to our previous study
conducted in the year 2016 and “experiment (’17)” refers to the new one in 2017.
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3. Experimental result shows the trend of load shedding/shifting effects, different behaviors
over fixed/dynamic coupon targets, financial benefits of the LSE and end-consumers, impact
of periodic lotteries on human behaviors, as well as the effective cost saving of Energy-
Coupon over traditional DR programs.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the system architecture and the
interface of the EnergyCoupon App. Key algorithms including price prediction, baseline predic-
tion, individualized target settling and lottery are explained in Section 4.3. Experimental design
is described in Section 4.4, and data analysis is shown in Section 4.5. We finally conclude our
findings in Section 4.6.
4.2 System Overview
The EnergyCoupon system is designed to inform the end-consumers about the upcoming DR
event along with individualized targets, measure the demand reduction during the DR event, pro-
vide statistics and tips for energy saving, as well as operate periodic lotteries. Fig. 4.1 exhibits the
system architecture of EnergyCoupon. As the core component in the architecture, a SQL database
is hosted on a server running 24 hours a day, interacting with the data resources (shows in blue
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blocks), mathematical algorithms (green blocks) and the lottery scheme (pink blocks). An En-
ergyCoupon App (both Android/IOS versions available) is developed and installed in the mobile
phones of the treatment group subjects. The app (interface shown in Fig. 4.2) receives coupon
targets, tips and statistics, and is also used to submit coupons in the lottery. A brief overview of
the remaining components is as follows:
SmartMeter











Figure 4.1: System architecture. Reprinted with permission from [3].
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.2: EnergyCoupon app interface. (a) Main page, coupon targets and tips (b) Usage statis-
tics (c) Lottery interface. Reprinted with permission from [3].
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(1) SmartMeterTexas: The source of the electricity consumption of all end-consumers in 15-min
resolution [96]. Data is used in baseline prediction and coupon target generation algorithms in
Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
(2) ERCOT Data: The source of day-ahead and real-time market prices, as well as the system load
in ERCOT area [30]. Data is used in the price prediction algorithm described in Section 4.3.1.
(3) Weather Data: The source of weather information used in the price (Section 4.3.1) and baseline
prediction algorithms (4.3.2).
(4) Price Prediction: An algorithm with the purpose of determining whether a dynamic DR event
should be announced two hours in advance. This algorithm is introduced in detail in Section
4.3.1.
(5) Baseline Estimate: An algorithm with the target of predicting the “normal consumption” of
the end-consumer without DR. This algorithm is designed to eliminate the gaming effects
described in [97] while keeping a relatively high accuracy. Details are included in Section
4.3.2.
(6) Tips and Usage Statistics: Usage statistics are provided including the estimate of the number of
coupons the user is likely to win, and his/her behavior compared with neighbors. Personalized
tips to save energy are generated based on his/her usage statistics.
(7) Coupon Generation: DR events are determined according to price prediction, and personalized
target are generated using baseline estimate. See Section 4.3.3 for details.
(8) Lottery: Periodic lotteries enable the end-consumers to convert his/her coupons earned into
dollar-value gifts. See Section 4.3.4 for more details.
4.3 Algorithms
In this Section, we will elaborate the key analytics behind the experiment (’17). These in-
clude the price prediction, baseline estimate, coupon generation, and lottery. These analytics are
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important not only to this experiment, but also to any other possible means of demand response
mechanisms.
4.3.1 Price Prediction
We would like to incentivize load shift from peak (price) hours to non-peak (price) hours for
end-customers. In order to run our system in real-time, we must be capable to predict the high
price occurrences ahead of time. Regarding the topic on electricity price prediction, various work
has been carried out so far. Time series models are used to predict day-ahead electricity prices
in [98, 99]. A combination of wavelet transform and ARIMA model is considered in [100]. A
hybrid method mixed with time series and neural network is discussed in [101]. In [102], spot
price prediction is conducted with load prediction and wind power generation involved. We have
different concerns on price prediction given the specific requirements of EnergyCoupon system,
since there is less interest in the exact number of the price. Instead, the label of the price, either
high or low, is more valuable. Moreover, time series techniques have good performance in handling
data with repeating periods, i.e. 24 hours, and achieve high accuracy in predicting the following
successive samples. The high prices we target in our situation do not have such behavior. Also,
as an online algorithm, low computing complexity is critical. Together with all the concerns, we
design and deploy a specific decision tree to deal with the price prediction in our system.
Decision tree is a well-known classifier with selected features in non-leaf nodes and labels
in leaf nodes. Different from traditional ones, we have unbalance error concerns in our Ener-
gyCoupon system, as a false high price alert will not induce much loss since the total budget is
controlled by lottery prizes. However, a failure in actual high price catch may cause loss of ef-
ficiency. Hence, our decision tree should have higher tolerance in false positive errors than false
negative ones. This can be captured by adjusting the penalty ratio between two kinds of errors in
training stage, though one must be careful in doing so due to the risk of overfitting the training set.
Considering the DR procedure conducted by our system, we believe a 2-hour time window
is reasonable for participants to react. Given the target time slot to be 2-hour in advance, there
are enormous features in both spatial and temporal space to choose from. Since air-conditioning
77
dominates household electricity consumption in Texas and weather has an impact on renewable
energy availability as well, we finalize five fundamental feature classes: Price(π), Demand(P ),
Temperature(T ), Humidity(H) and WindSpeed(W ). Furthermore, we choose the temporal offsets
in each feature class according to the self/cross-correlation between the feature and the price label.
A numerical study on high price appearances based on different thresholds is carried out to choose
a proper threshold in our study, so as to label data samples. Table 2 in reference [3] shows the
prediction accuracy over 90% in validation.
Details on training data preparation, feature selection and performance evaluation are beyond
the scope of this chapter. readers may refer to [3] for more information.
4.3.2 Baseline Estimate
As defined by the U.S. Department of Energy, baseline is the “normal consumption pattern” by
end-consumers without the impact of DR [70]. Daily baseline prediction algorithm is with crucial
importance in our EnergyCoupon program, since it affects the energy reduction measurement, and
the number of coupons issued to participants. Energy reduction for an end-consumer i on interval
k in a particular day D, PDDR,i(k) is calculated as the difference between the the subject’s predicted
baseline PDbase,i(k) and his/her real electricity consumption P
D
real,i(k) (as shown in (4.1)); P
D
real,i(k)




Reference [3,97,103] address the limitations of conventional baseline estimate algorithms used
by the ISOs [71, 72] considering baseline manipulation and user’s dilemma. The “similar day”
algorithm was sprouted in our previous work [3].
Deriving from k-nearest neighbors algorithm (k-NN) and kernel regression [104, 105], this
proposed “similar day” algorithm 1) predicts the baseline by matching the targeted 6-hour time
window with historical windows having the same time of day and similar ambient temperature
(measured by Euclidian distance, see 4.2); 2) efficiently eliminates the gaming effect of participants
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(TD,t(k)− T l,t(k))2, (4.2)
where D, l represents the index of the target day and a particular historical day, t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} in
the index of time window, Nt is the number of samples in each section. Therefore, the day-ahead
baseline in this section is calculated as the average consumption of all corresponding Ns “similar







Previously the “hybrid” method is adopted as the baseline estimate algorithm in experiment
(’16) [3]. However, later we discovered that this algorithm neither 1) eliminated gaming effects,
nor 2) kept a small prediction error due to large diversity among residential end-consumers. There-
fore, the “similar day” algorithm is used in both baseline estimate and data analysis in the recent
EnergyCoupon experiment in 2017.
4.3.3 Individualized Target Settling and Coupon Generation
There are two types of DR events in the EnergyCoupon program: “fixed” and “dynamic”.
Both types of event last for 30 min, and only appear during 1-7 pm every day. However, the
major difference of two types of event lies in the way to determine the time period. Through price
statistics in ERCOT real-time market [30], “fixed” events are pre-determined on the periods that
have highest probability to have peak prices. In contrast, “dynamic” events are triggered when
the 2 hour-ahead predicted price (calculated using the algorithm in Section 4.3.1) is higher than
$50/MWh. “Fixed” event periods are unchanged during the month, with up to no more than 3
times in a day; while there is no restriction for the number of “dynamic” events. These two types
of DR events are collectively referred to as “hybrid” event.
After the time period of a DR event is determined, a multi-layer coupon target is generated only
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depending on individual predicted baseline, regardless of the specific event type. Fig. 4.3 shows
the multi-layer structure of the coupon target. When a particular end-consumer reduces his/her
electricity consumption to 70% of the predicted baseline (yellow region), he/she will be awarded
2 coupons; when he/she further reduces the usage to the green region (more than 70% reduction




Yellow zone: 2 coupons
Green zone: 5 coupons
White zone: no coupon
Figure 4.3: Individual target setting. Reprinted with permission from [3].
Fig. 4.4 summarizes the logic flow of a coupon target generated based on algorithms introduced
in Section 4.3.1 to 4.3.3.
4.3.4 Lottery Algorithms
Due to the framing effect and the prospect theory [106–109], lottery scheme is considered to
provide incentives to desired human behaviors when there is a large group and each person con-
tributes a small impact. In our experiment, weekly lotteries are provided to convert end-consumers’
earned coupons into dollar-value prizes. Three amazon gift cards with face value $20, $10 and $5
are issued to the lottery winners every week. A participant is allowed to bid any positive number
of coupons (no more than the number he/she has) in each lottery; the more coupons he/she bids,
the higher probability he/she will win the prize. End-consumers are also allowed to collect the






















Figure 4.4: EnergyCoupon algorithm flow chart. Reprinted with permission from [3].
4.4 Experiment Design
4.4.1 Brief summary of Experiment (’16)
A small-scale preliminary EnergyCoupon experiment was carried out between June and August
in 2016, and 7 end-consumers were recruited in the same residential area in Cypress, Texas. Each
subject received a number of 30-min-length DR events along with coupon targets, between 1-7 pm
every day, and they are allowed to participate in lotteries with $35 amazon gift card in total every
week. Peak time estimate, individualized target settling, coupon generation and lottery scheme
followed the algorithms introduced in Section 4.3. “Hybrid” method was used in baseline estimate,
and “similar day” was used in posterior data analysis with normalization.
Experimental result shows a load shifting from peak to off-peak hours; it yields substantial
savings for the LSE, about $0.44/(week · user) on average, and $1.15/(week · subject) for active
subjects. Readers can refer to [3] for more details.
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4.4.2 Subjects in Experiment (’17)
A larger-scale EnergyCoupon experiment was conducted in the summer of 2017, with 29
anonymous residential end-consumers in Woodland, Texas recruited to form the treatment group.
All these end-consumers are employees of a local utility company named MP2 energy. The exper-
iment was purely voluntary and end-consumers were free to quit the experiment at any time.
In addition, the electricity consumption data for another 16 anonymous residential end-consumers
is also provided by MP2 energy. Those end-consumers form the comparison group. The relation-
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Figure 4.5: Subjects in experiment (’17). (a) Treatment vs. comparison group (b) Subgroup 1 vs.
Subgroup 2 (c) Active vs. Inactive subgroups. Numbers in brackets are group sizes.
4.4.3 Procedure in Experiment (’17)
The experiment lasted for 12 weeks from Jun 10, 2017 to Sep 1, 2017. The treatment group
subjects were asked to create an account for SmartMeterTexas.com in order for the server to track
their energy consumptions during the experiment. In Week 0 (Jun 10-Jun 16, 2017), the treatment
group subjects were asked to download and install the EnergyCoupon App, get familiar with inter-
faces, practice to make energy reduction following individualized coupon targets and participate
into the lottery. The electricity consumption data during this period of time is neither considered
as the experimental data, nor used as the historical data in baseline estimate.
During the experiment, the treatment group subjects were able to see the coupon targets at
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least 2 hours prior to the DR event. A subject who wanted to save energy only needed to turn
off/change the setpoints of his/her appliances during the 30-min-length DR event period. The
subject’s electricity consumption would be recorded by the smart meter installed in the house and
data would be available to the server within 36 hours. Each subject would be awarded coupons
based on his/her coupon target achievement during the DR events.
In the first three weeks (Jun 17, 2017 to Jul 7, 2017), all the subjects in the treatment group were
faced with “hybrid” coupon targets; Starting from Jul 8, 2017, and till the end of the experiment,
those subjects were randomly assigned to two subgroups (Subgroup 1 and 2, or S1 and S2 for
short) with almost the same scale (14 subjects in S1 and 15 in S2). S1 and S2 subjects only
received “fixed” and “dynamic” coupon targets separately (Fig. 4.5(b)).
The “similar day” algorithm is used in baseline estimate, and coupon target generation follows
the algorithm in Section 4.3.3. All DR events were generated within 1-7 pm every day.
Weekly lotteries were provided during the experiment, with each lottery cycle beginning at
12:00 am on Saturday and till 11:59 pm on the next Friday. Lotteries are designed following the
algorithm explained in Section 4.3.4. For the analysis purpose, at the end the the whole experiment,
all subjects in the treatment group are assigned into another two subgroups according to their
lottery engagements. Subjects who participated at least 5 out of totally 11 lotteries (7 subjects) are
called active subjects and assigned to the “Active” subgroup, and the remaining treatment group
subjects (22 subjects) are regarded as inactive subjects and are assigned to the “Inactive” subgroup.
As Fig. 4.5(c) shows, 2 active subjects belong to S1 and 5 belong to S2, and 12 of the inactive
subjects belong to S1 and 10 belong to S2.
As we have briefly described in Section 4.1, there are major differences between the designs of
EnergyCoupon experiment (’16) and (’17). Change of the algorithm and removal of normalization
in baseline estimate help to increase the prediction precision and eliminate gaming effect, the avail-
ability of comparison group provides an alternative in measuring energy saving for the treatment
group, and the assignment of S1 and S2 helps to reveal more behaviors of end-consumers.
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4.5 Data Analysis
Through experiment (’17) our server has collected electricity consumption data for all the sub-
jects in the treatment and comparison groups. In this section, the calculation and discussion on
the energy saving for the treatment group is from subsection 4.5.1 to 4.5.2; Financial benefit for
this experiment is estimated in 4.5.4, and behavioral changes due to lottery is investigated from
subsection 4.5.5 to 4.5.7.
4.5.1 Energy Saving for the Treatment Group
There are two ways to measure the electricity reduction for the treatment group during the
experiment: compare the real electricity consumption with (i) historical consumption data or (ii)
consumers’ baseline. Fig. 4.6 exhibits the energy consumption ratio of the treatment and compari-
son groups following method (i). The ratio is defined as the group’s weekly consumption between
1-7 pm divided by historical consumption in 2016, and a lower ratio indicates a higher energy
reduction level during peak hours.




























Figure 4.6: Energy saving at 1-7 pm for treatment and comparison group during the experiment
(2017), based on the consumption of same days in 2016 2
2Historical consumption data for some treatment group subjects in Week 9, 2016 is not available; We used dashed
lines to show the less reliable trend between Week 8-9 and 9-10.
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Fig. 4.6 shows the energy saving for the active subjects during the experiment. While the
ratios for inactive and comparison groups are around 1 in most weeks during the experiment, there
is clear gap between the active subjects (red curve) and these two groups. Active subjects consume
less electricity in most weeks compared with their consumption in 2016, with the maximum saving
around 40% in Week 8.
The disadvantage of method (i) is that we cannot tell the exact energy saving, since there are
variables that change between the year 2016 and 2017. Energy saving will be measured using
method (ii) in the next subsection.
4.5.2 Comparison between Active and Inactive Subjects in Treatment Group
As introduced above, method (i) calculates energy consumption ratio using the estimated base-
line as the reference, instead of historical consumption in 2016. Fig. 4.7 shows the energy saving
ratios of active, inactive subgroups and the whole treatment group.
























Figure 4.7: Energy saving at 1-7 pm for active/inactive subjects by week, based on their baseline
consumptions
The performance of the inactive subgroup is quite constant, with the ratio around 1.0 in most
of the weeks, and never falls below 0.9. This is accord with our intuition that less engagement in
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lottery is a sign of lack of enthusiasm about energy saving in the EnergyCoupon program. Since
inactive subjects take the majority of the treatment group (as shown in Fig. 4.5), the gap between
the blue and black curves are minor.
The curve for the active subgroup is far below the other two curves, indicating the energy
saving and load pattern change for active subjects during the experiment. Energy saving for the
active subgroup gradually increases in the first few weeks and reaches the peak at about 40% in
Week 8. After Week 9, the saving begins to decline, until reach only 10% in Week 11. The
rebound of the ratio can be explained by the Harvey hurricane arrived in Week 10 and 11, which
may distract the subjects from the DR program.
To better visualize the load pattern change for the active subjects, 24-hour average real con-
sumptions (red curves) are illustrated for the active and inactive subgroups in a particular week
(7/29-8/4/2017), and the corresponding baselines (blue curves) are set as references (Fig. 4.8).
Energy saving during 1-7 pm (interval 27-38) for active subjects can be calculated as 28.9%, while
that of inactive subjects is only −0.2%. The close-to-zero energy saving for inactive subjects
is unsurprising, and also proves the precision of our baseline estimate from another prespective;
However, the surprising finding from Fig. 4.8(a) is the load shedding effect in non-peak hours
(25.0% energy saving). This observation conflicts with our previous assumption of pure load shift-
ing in [3], and it can be explained by the assumption that there is “inertia” in demand response;
incentivized energy reduction in peak hours would influence that of off-peak hours.
4.5.3 Comparison between Subjects in Treatment Group Facing Fixed/dynamic Coupons
Starting from Week 3 and till the end of the experiment, the treatment group subjects are
randomly assigned into two subgroups S1 and S2 facing “fixed” and “dynamic” coupon targets
seperately. We aim to discover the effectiveness of different types of coupon targets on energy
saving of end-consumers. Energy savings for these two subgroups during 1-7 pm are exhibited in
Fig. 4.9(a).
As observed from Fig. 4.9(a), the active subjects in S1 and S2 are not homogeneous, as S1 on
average saves 35% and S2 saves −5% in Week 1-2. However, a clear “activation” is observed for
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Figure 4.8: Daily consumption vs. baseline for active/inactive subjects (7/29/2017-8/4/2017). (a)

























































Figure 4.9: Behavior comparisons between subjects facing fixed (Subgroup 1) and dynamic
coupons (Subgroup 2). (a) Average energy saving at 1-7 pm (b) Coupon target achievement per-
centage
S2 subjects, as their energy saving jumps from −5% to −10% in Week 3-10; while no such effect
is observed for S1 subjects. In week 11, the energy saving for S2 subjects returns to their initial
level, which can be attributed to the hurricane.
Fig. 4.9(b) illustrates the coupon target achievement ratios of active subjects in two subgroups.
The ratio is defined as the proportion of DR events that the subjects at least earn one coupon
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(reduce at least 30% energy from their baseline). Comparing Fig. 4.9(a)(b), an interesting finding
is that although S1 has higher energy saving than S2 in all periods, both subgroups reach a similar
level of coupon achievement.
One possible explanation for our observation is that S1 subjects facing “fixed” DR events would
prefer to program their home appliances (such as AC) in advance to hit coupon targets, and do not
change their setpoints frequently. This results in a decrease of electricity consumption at around 1
pm and the rebound at 7 pm, which clearly is an overreaction to coupon targets. At the same time,
S2 subjects facing “dynamic” DR events have to check the app more regularly, since dynamic
coupon targets only appear within 2 hours in advance. Therefore, they are more aware of the
coupon targets, and can hit the targets and earn coupons more “efficiently” with minimum energy
reduction. To support our explanation, Fig. 4.10 provides the load patterns of two active subjects
in S1 and S2 for a particular day.
















































Figure 4.10: Energy consumption curve for two active subjects on 7/19/2017. (a) Subject No.19
(Subgroup 1) (b) Subject No.18 (Subgroup 2)
4.5.4 Financial Benefit Analysis
Previously we assume that all the subjects perform pure load shifting from peak to off-peak
hours [3]; therefore, the DR program will bring financial benefits to both the LSE and active end-
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consumers, since LSE could reduce their purchase in peak price hours, while not losing its retail
revenue, and end-consumers win extra rewards from the LSE for their energy saving behaviors
during peak hours. However, our finding in Section 4.5.2 conflicts with the pure load shifting
assumption. Therefore, it’s not obvious whether the LSE and end-consumers reach a win-win
situation.
The net benefit for the LSE consists for three parts: (a) the saving in electricity purchase in
high-price hours (b) the decrease of sales revenue due to the load shedding effect and (c) the cost
of rewards issued to lottery winners. Our calculation shows the saving in three parts is $2.6, $−2.7
and 4.0/(week · activesubject). Due to the load shedding effect, the loss in (b) offsets the benefit
in (a) and the LSE suffers a net loss close to 4.0/(week · activesubject).








2.7− 4.0 4.0 + 2.7
An active subject, in contrast, on average receives $4.0 lottery rewards per week from the LSE;
at the same time, the load shedding effect leads to the decrease of his/her electric bill by around
$2.7 per week. Therefore, our EnergyCoupon program brings positive financial benefit to active
subjects.
Although this experiment did not bring a win-win situation to both the LSE and end-consumers,
it still increases the social welfare on the demand side, as the summation of benefits is positive
($2.6/(week · subject)). We can also summarize that the financial benefit of LSE in the DR
program is closely related to the level of load shifting in the subjects’ behavior; if the load shift is
minor, cost saving from its purchase may not cover the loss of retail revenue, which leads to a net
financial loss to the LSE.
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4.5.5 Influence of Lottery on Human Behaviors
As discussed in Section 4.3.4, the lottery scheme is considered to provide incentive to desirable
behaviors of the treatment group. Table 4.4 lists some influences of the lottery on the participants’
behaviors.

























The first column in Table 4.4 shows that winning a lottery prize has a positive impact on the
energy saving, as lottery winners make an energy saving improvement of 10.7% in the next lottery
cycle on average (for example, 10% to 20.7%). In contrast, the average energy saving improve-
ment for prizeless participants is close to zero (−0.03%). The second and third columns clearly
demonstrate that lottery winners on average tend to have higher engagements than prizeless partic-
ipants in the next lottery (56.6% to 40.0%) and next three lotteries (80.5% to 70.0%). Therefore,
we can summarize that the lottery prize has positive impacts on both energy saving and lottery
engagements in future lottery cycles.
4.5.6 Comparison with previous CPP Experiment
In this subsection, we compare our EnergyCoupon experiment with previous price-based DR
experiment conducted by Prof. Wolak [76], which was carried out in Anaheim, CA in the year
of 2005. Critical peak pricing (CPP) was used in this experiment; CPP days are selected based
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on some price prediction algorithm, and on CPP days during noon-6 pm, subjects in the treatment
group receives $0.35 for every kWh reduction from baseline. Some comparisons of these two
experiments are listed in Table 4.5.




































a Electricity reductions for active and inac-
tive subjects are 24.8% and 7.36%, respec-
tively.
b We choose retail price in Anaheim in 2005
as $0.095/kWh [110], and average re-
tail price in Woodland, TX in 2017 as
$0.090/kWh [81].
We can observe that our experiment has reached a similar level of energy reduction with the
CPP experiment (12% to 10.7%). Since our EnergyCoupon provides DR events every day com-
pared with only 12 CPP days in their experiment, EnergyCoupon project helps to save energy more
efficiently than the CPP experiment.
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Moreover, effective cost is defined as the cost of reducing 1 kWh of electricity during peak
hours. This value in our experiment is calculated by the total value of lottery prizes divided by the
energy reduction for all treatment group subjects. Data analysis shows that effective cost in our
experiment ($0.053/kWh) is only 1/7 of that in the CPP experiment.
4.5.7 Cost Saving Decomposition
In this subsection we would like to estimate how the lottery scheme contributes to the effective
cost saving in our EnergyCoupon experiment, compared with previous CPP experiment described
in Section 4.5.6. We split and model the contributions of (i) the lottery scheme and (ii) other
features of EnergyCoupon (CIDR, mobile app) as
CCPP = αβCEnergyCoupon, (4.4)
where C(·) represents the effective cost shown in Table 4.5 (CCPP = 0.35, CEnergyCoupon = 0.053),
and α, β are the contributions of the above two factors ((i), (ii)), modeled as multipliers to the
effective cost of EnergyCoupon.
The value α can be estimated using cumulative prospect theory. As a behavioral game theory,
this theory describes the individual choice between risky probabilistic alternatives [107]. It models
the probability weighting and loss aversion, which leads to the overweighting of small probabilities
and underweighting of moderate and high probabilities. A gain prospect f = (xi, pi) describes a
prospect results in the multiple outcome xi, xi < xj iff i < j with probability pi, and
∑
i pi = 1.





where V (·) is the utility function, πi are decision weights calculated by
πi = w(pi+, ...,+pn)− w(pi+1+, ...,+pn), 0 ≤ i < N, (4.6)
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and w(·) is the probability weighting function.
As a rough estimate, according to the coupons they have earned, on average each active subject
has approximately 7.0% chance to win each prize ($20, $10 and $5) in the weekly lottery; the
probability for an inactive user to win each prize is around 2.3%. Therefore, the prospect each
active/inactive subject faces (fa and fb) can be described as
fa =(0.79, $0, 0.07, $5, 0.07, $10, 0.07, $20),
fb =(0.931, $0, 0.023, $5, 0.023, $10, 0.023, $20).
(4.7)
Since each lottery prize is relatively small (< $200), the utility function V (·) is linear and can be
eliminated from both sides of (4.5) [109]; thus the certain equivalent can be calculated as
f ea =w(0.07)× (5 + 10 + 20) = $5.25,
f eb =w(0.023)× (5 + 10 + 20) = $2.28.
(4.8)
The value of w(·) comes from the estimate in [107]. Equation (4.8) shows the estimate of direct
cash needed in our experiment to maintain the same level of incentive to the treatment group, if no
lottery scheme is adopted (f ea × 7 + f eb × 22 = 86.91). Therefore, multiplier α is estimated as the
ratio of equivalent cash divided by total weekly lottery prizes α = 86.91/35 = 2.48. According
to (4.4), β = 2.66 and we can conclude that lottery scheme and other EnergyCoupon designs have
equal levels of contribution to reducing the effective cost.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents the design and critically assesses the empirical experiment of coupon
incentive-based demand response for end-consumers over a two-year period in Houston area. D-
ifferent from traditional price-based DR programs, EnergyCoupon has the following features: (1)
Dynamic time-of-the-day DR events and individualized coupon targets; (2) End-consumers re-
ceive coupon targets and usage statistics through mobile app; (3) Periodic lottery allows to convert
coupons into dollar-value prizes.
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Data analysis shows that there is significant load shedding effect for the treatment group, but
not much load shifting effect is observed. In addition, there are incentives of lottery prizes on
desirable behaviors such as energy saving improvement and lottery participation. Our experiment
has much lower DR cost (c5.3/kWh) compared with previous CPP projects (c35.0/kWh); Using
prospect theory we estimate that the design of system architecture and lottery scheme have equal
contributions to the cost saving.
This chapter is generalizable towards other Internet-of-Things-enabled demand response activ-
ities, and could shed light on the overall discussion of incentive-based versus price-based demand
response.
Future work would examine the value added from obtaining the consumer behavior data in this
experiment. Another possible venue of future work is to further develop a platform that allows for
the end users to aggregate and participate in wholesale level ancillary services.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we explored the market methods to approach resource management problem for
both supply and demand in the Smart Grid. In Chapter 2, we designed a bilateral energy sharing
market which maximizes the resource utilization through high trade ratio with a unified price and
evaluated the system by a PV market case study with parameters chosen from realistic statistics.
We further provided an extension of such secondary market in price anticipating scenario, which
could provide stochastic energy service in the Smart Grid. In Chapter 3, we developed a coupon
incentive-based demand response market to encourage end-customers to shift their electricity us-
age from peak hours to off-peak hours. We simulated our system with Texas data and showed that a
LSE can potentially attain substantial savings using our scheme. We modeled both market systems
in a Mean Field Game framework and showed the existence of desirable equilibria. In last chapter,
we presented the design and implementation of a real world experiment system as we discussed
in Chapter 3. The experiment results indicated that to achieve same amount of consumption re-
duction, the effective cost of demand response providers can be reduced substantially through our
system compared with other demand response schemes.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 2
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall the definition of A(b) : D × D ∩ [0, b + s/(1 + α)]. We claim
the effective bid of a server, xs, lies in a compact set with an upper bound x̄s, which follows
from the argument that no server will bid above x̄s < ∞ such that the expected return is below
cserve (since this has to be paid in every time-frame). By (2.1), when a server bids xs we have
only the clients with budget b ≥ xs − s/(1 + α) will respond so that the expected return is
given by
∫∞
xs−s/(1+α) π̂(b̂)(xs + α(xs − b̂)
+)db̂ ≤
∫∞
xs−s/(1+α) π̂(b̂)(xs + sα/(1 + α))db̂ = P(b̂ ≥
xs−s/(1+α))(xs+sα/(1+α)). However, all budget distributions in our system are stochastically
dominated by the distribution obtained by transferring all wealth s − cserve + sα/(1 + α) to the
server in every time period. Note that the initial budget is given by the regeneration distribution
that has support Binit. We will assume that Binit is bounded with upper-bound b̄init. Given the
lifetime of an agent in the system is geometrically distributed with parameter 1− β, we have
P
(





Thus, we have the expected return of the server
(xs + sα/1 + α)P(b̂ ≥ xs − s/(1 + α)) ≤ (xs + sα/1 + α)βxs−s/(1+α)−b̄init , and
lim
xs→∞
(xs + sα/1 + α)P(b̂ ≥ xs − s/(1 + α)) ≤ lim
xs→∞





(xs + sα/1 + α)β
xs−s/(1+α)−b̄init .
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We will assume that the parameters (β, s, α) are chosen such that R ≥ cserve. Under this assump-
tion we set x̄s to be the largest root of the transcendental equation
cserve = (x+ sα/1 + α)β
x−s/(1+α)−b̄init .
Meanwhile, as a client, given a finite budget b, the closed interval [0, b + s/(1 + α)] is compact.
Hence the effective action space lies in a compact set Â(b) , D ∩ [0, x̄s] × D ∩ [0, x̄c], where
x̄c , b+ s/(1 + α).
We define the reward per stage as
c(b, (xs, xc)) , ps(1− ρ̂c(xs))(xs − cserve) + pc
(
ρ̂s(xc)(s− E[X̃s|X̃s ≤ xc])− (1− ρ̂s(xc))close
)
.
Since cserve, s and close are constants, we have c(b, (xs, xc)) is bounded and continuous in (xs, xc).
Finally, the third result follows from the continuity of the transition kernelQ over discrete topology
of Â(b).
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose fn is monotonically increasing and x∗s, x∗c maximize Tρ̂,π̂fn(b) =



















Eρ̂[1x∗c≥x̃s(βfn(b+ s− x̃s − α(x̃s − b)+) + s− x̃s) + 1x∗c<x̃s(βfn(b)− close)]
)
= fn+1(b)
Proof of Lemma 5 Denote the expected trade ratio variable as κ. Consider the case in which
servers bid multiple values, w.l.o.g., we assume pX̃s = (pX̃s(k1), pX̃s(k2)), where cserve < k1 <
108
k2 < s and all clients can afford k2. By the four facts, we have the client will bid either k1 or k2.
We denote the probabilities of clients placing such bids as pX̃c = (pX̃c(k1), pX̃c(k2)). This gives us
κ =pX̃c(k1)pX̃s(k1) + pX̃c(k2)(pX̃s(k1) + pX̃s(k2))
=pX̃c(k1)pX̃s(k1) + pX̃c(k2)




(k′)), where k′ ∈ [k1, k2], p′X̃s(k
′) =
1, the clients who were bidding k2 will follow the new price k′, since it leads to a higher payoff.
Meanwhile, the clients who were bidding k1 will choose a bid between 0 and k′ by Fact 3. Bidding
k′ yields a lower but positive payoff compared with the earlier, however, bidding 0 yields a zero
payoff. Thus, these clients will bid k′ as well. The new trade ratio is then
κ′ =(pX̃c(k1) + pX̃c(k2))p
′
X̃s
(k′) = pX̃c(k1) + pX̃c(k2) > κ.
The proof above implies within the clients’ financial ability, merging two server’s bids always
increases the trade ratio, which induces the result of Lemma 5. Note that the proof also follows in
the case that pX̃c , pX̃s are p.d.fs by replacing the summations with integrals.
Proof of Lemma 6 By Lemma 4, we have v∗ρ̂ is monotonically increasing in b, which induces
the monotonicity of vc_win and vc_lose. Therefore, vc_win and vc_lose are bounded increasing on the




]. Define g(b) , vc_win(b)− vc_lose(b) for b ∈ [k− s1+α , k− s−kα ].
We have g(b) is of bounded variation, i.e. g(b) has finite total variation on [k − s
1+α
, k − s−k
α
].
Thus, the number of zero crossings of g(b) over the closed interval is finite. Therefore, θc,ρ̂(b)
is piecewise constant on [0, k − s−k
α
] with a finite number of constant intervals. Within each of
the intervals, θc,ρ̂(b) is constant and either 0 or k. At the boundaries of these intervals, where
vc_win(b) = vc_lose(b), we have θc,ρ̂(b) = {0, k}.
Proof of Lemma 7 From (2.5), for Borel set B, we have P(b[t + 1] ∈ B|b[t] = b) ≥ (1 −
β)Ψ(B) > 0, which satisfies the Doeblin condition. Then the budget chain is ergodic. The
rest of the first part proof follows the results in Chapter 12, Meyn and Tweedie [18]. Since the
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regeneration happens independently of the budget transition, between two regenerations, we could
further derive the relationship between π(B) and π(τ)(B|b), where τ is the first regeneration time






















Since π(·) is the invariant budget distribution through the transition kernel defined in (2.5),
π(τ)(B|b) is basically the τ -step transitions starting at b0 = b without regenerations. If B is
a Lebesgue null-set, we have Ψ(B) = 0 and in each of the τ step π(τ)(B|b) = 0, therefore,
π(B) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 8 We demonstrate the proof in two parts a) given π̂, v∗ẑ,π̂ is Lipschitz contin-
uous in ẑ, and b) given z, v∗ẑ,π̂ is Lipschitz continuous in π̂. Then the proof completes by applying
triangle inequality between the two parts.
a) For any given ẑ and π̂, by Theorem 1 there is a unique v∗ẑ,π̂(·) which is the unique fixed point of
the contraction mapping T jẑ,π̂ with Lipschitz constant λ ∈ (0, 1). Rewriting (2.3) in terms of ẑ and
k, we have
(T jẑ,π̂f)(b)











Ak(b) = [0, b+ s/(1 + α)] ∩ {0, k},
∆fs(b, k, cserve, π̂) =
∫∞
0
π̂(b̂)f(b + k − cserve + α(k − b̂)+)db̂ − f(b), and ∆fc(b, s, k, α) =
f(b+ s− k − α(k − b)+)− f(b).
Taking the derivative with respect to ẑ using the Envelope Theorem, we have T jẑ,π̂ is Lipschitz
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continuous in ẑ with constant k − cserve.








|ẑ1−ẑ2| ≤ k−cserve. Since v
∗
ẑ2,π̂
is the unique fixed point





















≤ λn(k − cserve). Also, we have the unique fixed point of T jẑ1,π̂ being v∗ẑ1,π̂. Letting n→∞, com-











≤ k − cserve
1− λ
b) We consider the Lipschitz continuity of v∗ẑ,π̂ in π̂. From the discussion in a), we only need to
show T jẑ,π̂ is Lipschitz continuous in π̂, then the rest of the proof goes through in the similar way.
Recall the expression of (T jẑ,π̂f)(b), there is only one term of interest, ∆fs(b, k, cserve, π̂) =
∫∞
0
π̂(b̂)f(b+k−cserve+α(k− b̂)+)db̂−f(b). According to Lemma 4, f is monotonic increasing.
Then, f is of bounded total variation on the closed interval [b+ k− cserve, b+ k− cserve + αk] for
any b. Therefore, given f , T jẑ,π̂ is Lipschitz continuous in π̂ with constant C = f(b+ k − cserve +
αk)− f(b+ k − cserve).
Proof of Theorem 3 Given ẑ and k, the optimal value function can be rewritten as
v∗ẑ,π̂(b)






1xc=k(s− k + β∆vc(b, s, k, α))− 1xc=0close
))











Ak(b) = [0, b+ s/(1 + α)] ∩ {0, k},
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∆vs(b, k, cserve, π̂) =
∫∞
0
π̂(b̂)v∗ẑ,π̂(b+ k − cserve + α(k − b̂)+)db̂− v∗ẑ,π̂(b), and ∆vc(b, s, k, α) =
v∗ẑ,π̂(b+ s− k − α(k − b)+)− v∗ẑ,π̂(b).
Define the increasing piecewise linear convex function hẑ(y):R 7→ R given by




where (·)+ := max(·, 0) and
φ(ẑ) := βv∗ẑ,π̂(b) + ps(1− ẑ)
(




s− k + close + β∆vc(b, s, k, α)
k
By Lemma 8, we have v∗ẑ,π̂(·) is continuous in ẑ for all xc ∈ Ak(b). Thus we have φ(ẑ) is continu-
ous in ẑ for all xc ∈ Ak(b). By Berge’s Maximum Theorem we have the correspondence,
F(y) := arg max
xc∈Ak(b)
(xcy)+








Given the Lipschitz continuity of v∗ẑ,π̂(·) in ẑ, we conclude for every state b, θc,ẑ(b) is upper hemi-
continuous in ẑ.
Proof of Theorem 4 By Lemma 7, given ẑ and π̂, we have the Markov process of the bud-
gets has a unique stationary distribution π = Π(ẑ, π̂). Here, we will prove the continuity of
Π(ẑ, π̂) in ẑ and π̂. By the Portmanteau Theorem, we only need to show that for any unifor-
m converging sequence ẑn → ẑ, a sequence of density functions π̂n → π̂ and any open set B,
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lim infn→∞ πn(B) ≥ π(B), where πn = Π(ẑn, π̂n). Thus, by Fatou’s Lemma, we have
lim inf
n→∞

















To complete the proof, we need to show that
lim inf
n→∞
π(τ)n (B|b) ≥ π(τ)(B|b). for every b ∈ Binit
The proof of the above holds by mathematical induction and the Skorokhod representation theo-
rem. Details of a similar proof can be found in the appendix of [19].
Proof of Theorem 5 Define the single-point inverse (lower inverse) θ−1c,ẑ (0) = {b ≥ 0 : 0 ∈
θc,ẑ(b)} and also the upper inverse θ̃−1c,ẑ (0) = {b ≥ 0 : θc,ẑ(b) = {0}}. By Lemma 6, we have
θ−1c,ẑ (0) consists of a finite number of closed subintervals in [0, k− s−kα ], and θ̃−1c,ẑ (0) a finite number
of open intervals (in R+) the closure of which is exactly θ−1c,ẑ (0), with the difference being only











so that θ−1c,ẑ (0) is a continuity set of πẑ,π̂ for every ẑ.
From the definition of θc,ẑ(·) we have
θ−1c,ẑ (0) =
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ(b) ≤
k − s− close
β
}
∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0}
θ̃−1c,ẑ (0) =
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ(b) <
k − s− close
β
}
∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0},
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where we have
h(b) = b+ s− k − α(k − b)+and {b : h(b) ≤ 0} =
[
0, k − s
1 + α
]
We know that v∗ẑ,π̂(·) is Lipschitz continuous in ẑ so that for all ε > 0 we have
‖vẑ′,π̂ − vẑ,π̂‖∞ ≤ Lε ∀ẑ′ ∈ [ẑ − ε, ẑ + ε] ∩ [0, 1]
‖vẑ′,π̂ − vẑ,π̂‖∞ < Lε ∀ẑ′ ∈ (ẑ − ε, ẑ + ε) ∩ [0, 1].
This then implies that for all {b ≥ k − s
1+α
: h(b) ≥ 0} we have
v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ,π̂(b)− 2Lε ≤ v∗ẑ′,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ′,π̂(b)
≤ v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ,π̂(b) + 2Lε ∀ẑ′ ∈ [ẑ − ε, ẑ + ε] ∩ [0, 1]
v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ,π̂(b)− 2Lε < v∗ẑ′,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ′,π̂(b)
< v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ,π̂(b) + 2Lε ∀ẑ′ ∈ (ẑ − ε, ẑ + ε) ∩ [0, 1]
Therefore we have
θ−1c,ẑ′(0) ⊆ Fẑ(ε), Oẑ(ε) ⊆ θ̃−1c,ẑ′(0),
where the closed set Fẑ(ε) and the open set Oẑ(ε) are given by
Fẑ(ε) =
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ,π̂(b) ≤




∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0},
Oẑ(ε) =
{
b : h(b) ≥ 0, v∗ẑ,π̂(h(b))− v∗ẑ(b) <




∪ {b : h(b) ≤ 0}.
Given a sequence {ẑn}n≥1 such that limn→∞ ẑn = ẑ, we know that πẑn,π̂ ⇒ πẑ,π̂. Next fix an
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ε > 0. Then by the Portmanteau theorem we have


































c,ẑ (0)) follows by noticing that for ε1 < ε2 we
have















PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 3
B.1 Properties of the optimal value function
Proof of Lemma 9
We first show that Tρf ∈ Φ for ∀f ∈ Φ. The proof then follows through a verification of the
conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in [111]. From the definition of Tρ in (3.15), we have
|Tρf(x)| ≤ |u(x)|+ max
a(x)∈A
θa(x) + βmax(|f(x+ w)|, |f(x− l)|).

























Let x+ be the unique positive surplus such that u(x+) = 1 and x− be the unique negative
surplus such that u(x−) = −1. Note that Ω(x) is non-decreasing for x ≥ x− and non-increasing
for x ≤ x+. To avoid cumbersome algebra we will assume x+ − w > 0 and x− + l > 0. Since
Ω(x) ≥ |u(x)| ≥ 0 and Ω(x) ≥ 1, the first two terms are bounded by 1 and maxa(x)∈A θa(x). For



























, if x ∈ [x+ − w, x+],
1, if x ∈ [x−, x+ − w],
1
|u(x)| ≤ 1, if x ∈ [x− − w, x−],
u(x+w)
u(x)
≤ 1, if x ≤ x− − w.








≤ 1 + u(x+ w)− u(w)
w
w.





x+ w − x+
(x+ w − x+) ≤ 1 +
u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+
w.




= u′(ξ1) ≤ sup
x≥x+
u′(x), ∀ξ1, x ∈ [x+,∞),
u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+
= u′(ξ2) ≤ sup
x∈[x+−w,x+]





≤ ‖f‖Ω(1 + w sup
x≥x+−w




























, if x ∈ [x−, x− + l],
1, if x ∈ [x− + l, x+],
1
u(x)
≤ 1, if x ∈ [x+, x+ + l],
u(x−l)
u(x)
≤ 1, if x ≤ x+l.





≤ ‖f‖Ω(1 + l sup
x∈X:x≤x−
u′(x)).
Since u(·) is Lipschitz, thus, there exists an α0 ∈ (0,+∞) such that ‖Tρf‖Ω ≤ α0.
Next, we need to verify the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in [111]. The lemma requires verifi-
cation of the following three conditions. We set x[k] to be the state variable denoting the surplus
at time k. We need to show that ∀x ∈ X, for some constants (independent of ρ) α1 > 0, α2 > 0
and 0 < α3 < 1,
sup
a(x)∈A
|u(x)− θa(x)| ≤ α1Ω(x), (B.1)
Ex[1],a0 [Ω(x[1])|x[0] = x] ≤ α2Ω(x), ∀a0 ∈ A, (B.2)
with the distribution of x[1] chosen based on action a0, and
βJEx[J ],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x] ≤ α3Ω(x), (B.3)
for some J > 0 and all possible action sequences, i.e., aj ∈ A for all j = 0, 1, . . . , J − 1 with the
distribution of x[J ] chosen based on the action sequence (a0, a1, . . . , aJ−1) chosen.
First consider (B.1). Since Ω(x) = max(|u(x)|, 1), using the earlier analysis in Section 3.4,
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(B.1) is true with α1 = 1 + maxa∈A θa. Now consider (B.2). We have
Ex[1],a0 [Ω(x[1])|x[0] = x] = Eρ[φ(pρ,a(x))Ω(x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x)),Ω(x− l)]
≤ max(Ω(x+ w),Ω(x− l)),
which is bounded by α2Ω(x) using our analysis from before.
Finally, (B.3) holds true using the properties of Ω(·), the bounds on the probability of winning
and losing (from Section 3.4) and our analysis from earlier in the proof as follows:
βJEx[J ],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x]
≤βJ max(φ(pW ), φ(1− pW ))
J max(Ω(x+ Jw),Ω(x− Jl))
≤(βmax(φ(pW ), φ(1− pW ))
Jα4(J)Ω(x),
for some affine α4(J) > 0 using our analysis from before. It now follows that take J large enough
we obtain an α3 < 1 that is also independent of ρ. Note that we can get a simpler bound of
βJEx[J ],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x] ≤ βJα4(J)Ω(x),
using just the properties of Ω(·). Again we can take J large enough to obtain a α3 < 1 that
is independent of ρ. This bound is useful when there is an action for which the probability of
winning or losing is 1. Since all the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 of [111] are met, then the first
result in the lemma holds true. The second then follows immediately from (3.14).
Proof of Lemma 10
For any given ρ, from Lemma 9 we know that there is a unique Vρ(·). Furthermore, it is the
unique fixed point of operator Tρ where T Jρ is a contraction mapping with constant α3 that is
independent of ρ. From (3.15), it follows that T Jρ is a continuous in ρ: computing derivatives using
the envelope theorem and the expressions from Section 3.4, it is easily established that T Jρ is, in
fact, Lipschitz with constant (M − 1)J when the uniform norm is used for ρ.
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be two population/action profiles such that ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖ ≤ ε (the choice of norm
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is irrelevant as all are equivalent for finite dimensional Euclidean spaces). As T Jρ is continuous in
ρ, there exists a δ > 0 such that ‖T Jρ1Vρ2 − T Jρ2Vρ2‖Ω ≤ δ. However, since T Jρ2Vρ2 = Vρ2 , we have
shown that ‖T Jρ1Vρ2 − Vρ2‖Ω ≤ δ. Applying T Jρ1 n times and using the contraction property of T Jρ1 ,
we get
‖T (n+1)Jρ1 Vρ2 − T nJρ1 Vρ2‖Ω ≤ αn3δ.
The proof then follows since limn→∞ ‖T nJρ1 Vρ2 − Vρ1‖Ω = 0 so that
‖Vρ1 − Vρ2‖Ω ≤
∞∑
n=0




Furthermore, using the comment from above we can show that Vρ is Lipschitz continuous in ρ.
B.2 The existence and uniqueness of stationary surplus distribution
Proof of Lemma 11
First, from the transition kernel (3.17), we satisfy the Doeblin condition as
P(x[k] ∈ B|x[k − 1] = x) ≥ (1− β)Ψ(B),
where 0 < β < 1, and Ψ is a probability measure for the regeneration process. Then from results
in [18, Chapter 12], we have a unique stationary surplus distribution.




P(B, τ = k) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B|τ = k) · P(τ = k). (B.4)
Since the regeneration process happens independently of the surplus with inter-regeneration times
geometrically distributed with parameter (1− β), then P(τ = k) = (1− β)βk. Also given τ = k,
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B.2.1 Existence of MFE
Proof of Lemma 12
Define the increasing and piecewise linear convex function
gρ(y) = max
a∈A









where ∆(A) is the probability simplex on A = |A| elements. By the properties of the lottery






σa (φ(pρ,a)y − θa) (B.7)
is upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Now let
A(y) := arg max g(y) = arg max
a∈A
φ(pρ,a)y − θa, (B.8)
then set-valued function above is exactly ∆(|A(y)|).
Hence, the optimal randomized policies at surplus x are a set-valued function ∆(|A(y)|) =
∆(|A(Vρ(x + w) − Vρ(x − l))|), which is upper semicontinuous due to the Lipschitz continuity
of Vρ(·) in ρ and the u.s.c. of φ(pρ,a) in ρ, i.e., for every state x, the action distribution σ(x) is
(pointwise) upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Proof of Lemma 13
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The existence and uniqueness of ζ(x) for a given ρ and σ(x), and the relationship between
ζ(·) and ζ(k)(·) are shown in Lemma 11. Now, we will prove the continuity of ζρ×σ in ρ and
σ(x) for every surplus x ∈ X. For the assumed action distribution ρ on the finite set A, we
consider the topology of pointwise convergence which is equivalent to the uniform convergence
by strong coupling results in [69]. For the randomized action distribution σ, corresponding to σ(x)
at each surplus x ∈ X, we consider the topology with metric ρ(σ1, σ2) = ∑∞j=1 2−j min(‖σ1(xj)−
σ2(xj)‖, 1), where ‖ · ‖ is any norm for R|A|.
First, we will show that the surplus distribution ζ(k)ρ×σ is continuous in ρ and σ. By Portmanteau
theorem, we only need to show that for any sequence ρn → ρ uniformly, σn → σ pointwise, and










Proof of Lemma 17
The proof proceeds by induction on k. For k = 0, ζ(0)ρn×σn(B|x) = 1(x∈B) is a point-mass at
x irrespective of ρn × σn, and in fact, for any n ∈ N+, we have ζ(0)ρn×σn(B|x) = ζ
(0)
ρ×σ(B|x). Let
ρn → ρ uniform, and σn(x)→ σ(x) pointwise for every surplus x. We will show that ζ(k)ρn×σn(B|x)
converges pointwise to ζ(k)ρ×σ(B|x).
We will refer to the measure and random variables corresponding to ρn × σn for the nth sys-
tem and those corresponding to ρ × σ as coming from the limiting system. We will prove that
ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) converges to ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x) pointwise using the metrics given above.
Suppose that the hypothesis holds true for k − 1 where k > 1, i.e., ζ(k−1)ρn×σn(B|x) converges
pointwise to ζ(k−1)ρ×σ (B|x). To prove this lemma, we only need to show that the hypothesis hold-
s for k. Let Pρ×σ,x(·) be the one-step transition probability measure of the surplus dynamic-
s conditioned on the initial state of the surplus being x, and there is no regeneration. Then
we have Pρn×σn,x(x + w) =
∑
a∈σn(x) pρn×σn,a, Pρn×σn,x(x − l) = 1 −
∑
a∈σn(x) pρn×σn,a and
Pρ×σ,x(x + w) =
∑
a∈σ(x) pρ×σ,a, Pρ×σ,x(x − l) = 1 −
∑
a∈σ(x) pρ×σ,a. By the properties of the
lottery, pρ×σ,a is continuous in ρ × σ for all a ∈ A, thus we have pρn×σn,a converges to pρ×σ,a
pointwise, i.e., Pρn×σn,x(·) converges to Pρ×σ,x(·) pointwise. By the Skorokhod representation the-
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orem [112], there exist random variables Xn and X on common probability space and a random





























where the second and third inequality hold due to Fatou’s lemma and the induction hypothesis.
Hence, for a given ρ and randomized policies σ(x), the unique stationary surplus distribution
ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) converges pointwise to ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x).
Now by Lemma 11 and Equation (3.18), we need to show that lim infn→∞ ζρn×σn(B) ≥
ζρ×σ(B). By Fatou’s lemma, we have
lim inf
n→∞
































Thus, for a given ρ and the randomize policies σ(x), the unique stationary surplus distribution
ζρn×σn converges pointwise to ζρ×σ. Then the stationary surplus distribution ζρ×σ is continuous in
ρ and σ(x) for every surplus x ∈ X.
Proof of Lemma 14
Given the stationary surplus distribution ζ(x) and the action distribution σ(x) at every surplus
x, those will introduce a population profile based on the actions chosen at each point x, denoted
that action distribution as ρ, and we have ρa =
∑
x∈X ζ(x) · σa(x), where a ∈ A, X is a countable
set and A is a finite set.
To show that ρ is continuous in ζ(x) and σ(x), we only need to show that for any sequence
{ζn}∞n=1 converging to ζ in uniform norm, {σn(x)}∞n=1 converging to σ(x) pointwise, we have
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{ρn}∞n=1 converges to ρ pointwise, which is equivalent to convergence in uniform norm as we have
a finite set A.
Since ζn → ζ uniformly, we have ∀ε1 > 0, ∃N1 ∈ N, so that ∀n ≥ N1, ∀x ∈ X, |ζn(x) −
ζ(x)| ≤ ε1. Similarly, {σn(x)}∞n=1 converges to σ(x) pointwise, we have ∀x ∈ X, and ∀ε2 > 0,
∃N2 ∈ N so that ∀n ≥ N2, , |σn(x)− σ(x)| ≤ ε2. Now consider ∀ε = max(ε1, ε2), we can find an





. Let N = max(N1, N2), for ∀x ∈ X \ X1,
∃n > N large enough, such that |σn,a(x)− σa(x)| ≤ ε2 . Then ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, we have











































































· 1 + 1 · ε
2
+ ε1 · 1 ≤ ε · 1 + ε · 1 = 2ε, (B.11)
where (a) follows from the fact that |σn,a(x)− σa(x)| ≤ 1 for ∀x ∈ X, and |σn,a(x)− σa(x)| < ε2 ,





for x ∈ X1.
Therefore, |ρn,a − ρa| < 2ε for all a ∈ A and ∀n ≥ N , hence ρn → ρ pointwise, which is
equivalent to convergence in uniform norm as we have a finite set A.
B.3 Characteristics of the best response policy
Proof of Lemma 15
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First, we consider x ∈ X and x ≥ 0. We have
u(x)− θa2(x) + β[pρ,a2(x)Vρ(x+ w) + (1− pρ,a2(x))Vρ(x− l)]
≷ u(x)− θa1(x) + β[pρ,a1(x)Vρ(x+ w) + (1− pρ,a1(x))Vρ(x− l)]
⇔ θa1(x) − θa2(x) ≷ β[(pρ,a1(x)− pρ,a2(x))Vρ(x+ w)
+ ((1− pρ,a1(x))− (1− pρ,a2(x)))Vρ(x− l)]
⇔ θa1(x) − θa2(x) ≷ β(pρ,a1(x)− pρ,a2(x))[Vρ(x+ w)− Vρ(x− l)]. (B.12)
As we assumed θa1(x) > θa2(x), it follows that pρ,a1(x) > pρ,a2(x). Also, since w + l > 0 and
Vρ(x) is increasing in x, so both sides of the above inequality are non-negative. Since Vρ(x) is
submodular when x ≥ −l, the RHS is a decreasing function of x. Let x∗a1,a2 ∈ X be the smallest
value such that LHS ≥ RHS, then for all x > x∗a1,a2 action a2(x) is preferred to action a1(x), for




at x∗a1,a2 the agent is indifferent between the two actions, and if instead LHS > RHS, then action
a2(x) is preferred to action a1(x). We call x∗a1,a2 the threshold value of surplus for actions a1(x)
and a2(x).
Similarly, for x ∈ X and x ≤ 0, Vρ(x) is supermodular when x ≤ w, which implies the
existence of a threshold policy.
Proof of Lemma 16
First, let f ∈ Φ, suppose that f is an increasing and submodular function. First we prove that
Tρf is increasing and submodular too. Let a∗(x) be an optimal action in the definition of Tρf(x)
when the surplus is x, i.e., one of the maximizers from (3.15). Let x1 > x2, then
Tρf(x1)− Tρf(x2) = u(x1)− u(x2)− θa∗(x1) + θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x1)(x1)f(x1 + w)+
(1− pρ,a∗(x1)(x1))f(x1 − l)− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)− (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]




+ (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x1 − l)− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)− (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
= u(x1)− u(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x1 + w + a)− f(x2 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))(f(x1 − l)− f(x2 − l))
]
≥ 0.
The first inequality holds because a∗(x2) need not be an optimal action when the surplus is x1.
Again, let x1 > x2 and let x > 0. Since u(·) is a concave function, it follows that it is
submodular, i.e.,
u(x1 + x)− u(x1) ≤ u(x2 + x)− u(x2)⇔ u(x1 + x) + u(x2) ≤ u(x2 + x) + u(x1).
Assuming that f ∈ Φ is submodular, we will now show that Tρf is also submodular. Consider
Tρf(x1 + x) + Tρf(x2) = u(x1 + x) + u(x2)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2)
+ β
[
pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x)f(x1 + x+ w) + pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))f(x1 + x− l) + (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
.
We assume without loss of generality that pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x) ≥ pρ,a∗(x2)(x2) and let δ be the
difference; if pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x) ≤ pρ,a∗(x2)(x2), then a similar proof establishes the result. Using
this we have the RHS (denoted by d) being
d = u(x1 + x) + u(x2)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 + w))




By submodularity of f(·) we have
f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 + w) ≤ f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 + w),
f(x1 + x− l) + f(x2 − l) ≤ f(x2 + x− l) + f(x1 − l),
f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 − l) ≤ f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 − l).
With these and using the submodularity of u(·) we get
d ≤ u(x2 + x) + u(x1)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 + w))
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))(f(x2 + x− l) + f(x1 − l)) + δ(f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 − l))
]
= u(x2 + x)− θa∗(x1+x) + β[pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + x+ w) + (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 + x− l)]
+ u(x1)− θa∗(x2) + β[pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x1 + w) + (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))f(x1 − l)]
≤ Tρf(x2 + x) + Tρf(x1),
where the last inequality holds as using the optimal actions (a∗(x2 + x), a∗(x1)) yields a higher
value as opposed to the sub-optimal actions (a∗(x1 + x), a∗(x2)) when the surplus is x2 + x and
x1.
Since both the monotonicity and submodularity properties are preserved when taking pointwise
limits, choosing f(·) ≡ 0 (or u(·)) to start the value iteration proves that the value function Vρ(·)
is increasing and submodular.
Similarly, if f ∈ Φ is an increasing and supermodular function, following the same argument,
we can prove that the value function Vρ(·) is increasing and supermodular.
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